Final Evaluation of Valley Clean Energy's Agricultural Pumping Dynamic Rate Pilot

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April 17, 2025

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Power outages in August 2020 led the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) to open a proceeding to consider actions in preparation for potential extreme weather in the summers of 2022 and 2023. The resulting Decision D.21-12-015 (the Decision) adopted a range of supply- and demand-side measures to address this issue, including two dynamic rate pilots to be implemented during a three-year period from 2022 through 2024. The Decision required mid-term and final evaluations of each pilot. This document represents the final evaluation of Valley Clean Energy's (VCE's) agricultural pumping dynamic rate pilot (AgFIT, or the Pilot).

The objective of the AgFIT Pilot was to test the interest and ability of agricultural customers in VCE's service territory to respond to hourly price signals. The primary question was whether they would choose to respond when provided a CalFUSE-based hourly price signal supported by well pump automation and customer support.

The Decision contains the following requirements for the evaluations:

1. The response of agricultural loads to prices.
2. The monthly bill impacts of the pilot dynamic rate in comparison to a customer's otherwise applicable tariff (OAT).
3. An evaluation of the recovery of generation and resource adequacy (RA) costs for customers on the pilot tariff.
4. An evaluation of the recovery of delivery costs for customers on the pilot tariff.

<u>Pricing and Billing Methods</u>

The dynamic prices consist of two components: a generation rate component corresponding to the services provided by VCE; and a distribution rate component for the services provided by PG&E. The Pilot pricing methodology was changed on May 1, 2023 and May 1, 2024. In the evaluation, we refer to the first pricing method as AgFIT 1.0, the second method as AgFIT 2.0, and the third method as AgFIT 2.1. The primary difference between the AgFIT 1.0 versus the 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods is the means of linking AgFIT pricing to OAT revenue levels:

- AgFIT 1.0 uses a fixed-quantity subscription priced at OAT levels;
- AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 replace the fixed-quantity subscription with an adder to the dynamic prices, calculated such that the average dynamic price is equal to the average seasonal OAT price paid by customers on the rate schedule.

In addition, at the same time AgFIT 2.0 was implemented, the method used to recover non-marginal generation costs was changed in a manner that resulted in reduced intra-day price variability.

According to the Decision, the shadow bill approach was adopted "to address PG&E's and CLECA's objections about the revenue neutrality of the VCE Pilot rate." Under this method, the customer continues to pay for its current usage at the OAT rates (e.g., Schedule AG-C), which did not require changes to PG&E's billing systems for the Pilot. For each month and service account (pump), the difference between the OAT bill and the AgFIT charges is recorded. At the end of a period of time[1], the monthly credits or debits are added up for each service account to determine whether a credit is paid to the customer. For any given service account, the customer is eligible to receive a credit if the sum of the AgFIT charges is less than the sum of the OAT bills. In contrast, if the sum of the AgFIT charges is greater than the sum of the OAT bills, then the customer is not responsible for paying an additional amount beyond their OAT bills for that service account.

Participant Summary

The customers enrolled in the Pilot are a mix of small, medium, and large agricultural customers that employ irrigation pumps to water different types of crops. The Pilot does not have a limit on the number of customers if the aggregate peak load of Pilot customers does not exceed 5 MW. Most enrolled Pilot customers have multiple pumps (service accounts). There were two customers with a combined total of 17 pumps in September 2022. By September 2023, the enrollment count increased to five customers with a combined total of 33 pumps. In September 2024, seven customers were enrolled with a total of 60 pumps.

Key Findings

- Customers face constraints that may limit their ability to respond to prices.
    - Agricultural pumping customers face a number of operational constraints that can vary seasonally and with weather conditions (e.g., causing them to need to run in all hours, not need to pump at all, or need to have minimum run times) that may affect their ability to shift or reduce load at any given time. While the load can sometimes be highly responsive, one should not assume that a high percentage of the pumping load will be curtailed in response to a specific high-price event.
- Automating pump operations helped customers respond to prices.
- Customers appeared to benefit from scheduling pumping via dynamic transactions (i.e., purchasing the electricity prior to the date on which the usage occurs).
    - Customers appeared to be effective in their use of pump scheduling, obtaining a lower average price per kWh than they would have paid if they'd purchased all usage at settlement prices. However, two-thirds of usage during the Pilot was purchased at settlement prices, so scheduled pumping was not the dominant behavior for most customers.
- Customers need more frequent billing feedback to understand the benefits. Shadow billing was challenging to implement, and customers did not receive monthly shadow bills. As a result, customers were not receiving timely feedback

[1] The expectation at the beginning of the Pilot was that credit calculations would be based on 12 months of billing data. In practice, the number of months used to calculate credits varied over the course of the Pilot.

on their performance during the Pilot, which could have affected their performance.

- Interviewed customers had positive views of the Pilot but had some reservations about whether they would adopt it as a permanent rate. They reported that managing usage under dynamic pricing is time consuming.
- The shadow bill credit method, with bill protection, affected Pilot results and how they ought to be interpreted.
    - The presence or absence of an AgFIT credit is not necessarily indicative of whether the customer benefited from Pilot participation.
    - Due to the Pilot's design, customers continued to receive and pay their regular OAT bills. We found evidence that at least some customers continued to pay attention to OAT price signals while participating in the Pilot, and as a result, we were unable to conduct a valid evaluation of customer response to Pilot prices alone.
- The change to one-part pricing under AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 addressed an issue in AgFIT 1.0's two-part pricing but had other consequences.
    - A motivation for changing from two-part pricing to one-part pricing (in May 2023) was to avoid subscription prices that were based on historical loads that did not reflect pumping needs in the Pilot period, which can affect a customer's ability to earn a credit. The one-part pricing method used in the 2023 and 2024 growing seasons addressed this issue by removing subscriptions and instead adjusting the dynamic prices to match the average rate paid on the pump's rate schedule.
    - The price adjustment method used in AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 can produce structural benefiters and non-benefiters because of the adjustment to the rate schedule average rate (rather than the pump's own average OAT rate).[2] Note that the presence of structural benefiters is common feature of voluntary rates (e.g., customers with flatter load profiles experience a lower bill after changing from a flat to a TOU rate, even prior to having any price response) and is therefore not necessarily a reason to avoid using the AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods.[3]
    - The price averaging used to develop AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 prices leads to pricing distortions in the days around price spikes that could be systematically arbitraged by customers.[4] While there is no evidence that customers engaged

[2] A "structural benefiter" is a customer that has lower AgFIT charges than its OAT bill without changing its usage level or pattern.

[3] Subscription pricing can produce a similar structural benefiter effect. For example, if a pump's subscription is based on a usage profile with a high load factor (i.e., comparatively constant usage across hours) but has less need for pumping in the Pilot period (thus resulting in a lower load factor usage profile), the customer will benefit from the low subscription price even if they don't alter their pumping plans in response to hourly prices.

[4] For example, a customer could systematically benefit by scheduling pumping for future days after experiencing a day with especially high prices, regardless of whether they expect to need to pump on those days. If they end up pumping, the purchased energy would tend to cost less than if they had purchased it at settlement prices and if they do not end up pumping, they would tend to benefit by selling the purchased energy at higher settlement prices.

in this form of arbitrage during the Pilot, the moving-average pricing method should not be used in future rate offerings to prevent the possibility of it happening.

  - Because of the limited experience under AgFIT 1.0 pricing and the difficulty in accounting for differences in conditions across growing seasons (e.g., variation in precipitation levels or crop rotations), we did not compare outcomes across the pricing methods.

- Customers pay more attention to hourly prices when they vary more from day to day and hour to hour.
  - Price variability was lower in 2024 than in 2023, which corresponded to less scheduling of pumping and reduced benefits from scheduling.

1 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Power outages in August 2020 led the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) to open a proceeding to consider actions in preparation for potential extreme weather in the summers of 2022 and 2023. The resulting Decision D.21-12-015 (the Decision) adopted a range of supply- and demand-side measures to address this issue, including two dynamic rate pilots to be implemented during a three-year period from 2022 through 2024. The Decision required mid-term and final evaluations of each pilot. This document represents the final evaluation of Valley Clean Energy's (VCE's) agricultural pumping dynamic rate pilot (AgFIT, or the Pilot).[5]

The agricultural sector accounts for 18 percent of VCE's total annual load and 16 percent of its peak demand (i.e., 35 MW out of 215 MW of peak demand).[6] The Pilot allows VCE to enroll agricultural pumping customers up to a 5 MW aggregated peak load cap, enabling up to 15 percent of its agricultural load to shift in response to changing market conditions.

The objective of the AgFIT Pilot was to test the interest and ability of agricultural customers in VCE's service territory to respond to hourly price signals. The primary question was whether they would choose to respond when provided a CalFUSE-based hourly price signal supported by well pump automation[7] and customer support.

The core element of the Pilot is to present participants with dynamic prices to assist in meeting the following goals:

- Reduce grid infrastructure costs and greenhouse gas emissions.
- Improve reliability and integration of renewables.
- Facilitate greater integration and fair compensation of distributed energy resources.[8]

The Decision states that the Pilot "provides an opportunity to assess the potential of a dynamic retail rate approach to incentivizing load shift" and that "[i]f loads do respond to the dynamic prices, then the Pilot will have achieved the intended purpose of shifting load to enhance system reliability."[9]

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[5] The other dynamic pricing pilot approved in the Decision was implemented by Southern California Edison.

[6] Opening Prepared Testimony of Gordon Samuel on Behalf of Valley Clean Energy, Rulemaking 20-11-003, September 1, 2021, p. 1.

[7] In the context of the Pilot, "automation" means customers have the ability to remotely control irrigation equipment through manual decision making. There is no automated control of pumping in response to prices. Human beings decide when to run irrigation pumps, sometimes after taking into consideration hourly electricity prices.

[8] CPUC Decision 21-12-015, p. 86.

[9] CPUC Decision 21-12-015, p. 91.

The Decision contains the following requirements for the evaluations[10]:

1. The response of agricultural loads to prices.
2. The monthly bill impacts of the pilot dynamic rate in comparison to a customer's otherwise applicable tariff (OAT).
3. An evaluation of the recovery of generation and resource adequacy (RA) costs for customers on the pilot tariff.
4. An evaluation of the recovery of delivery costs for customers on the pilot tariff.

The report is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the Pilot; Section 3 provides a summary of customer interviews. Section 4 contains our evaluation of customer load response; Section 5 contains the Pilot and OAT bill comparisons; Section 6 discusses Pilot cost recovery issues; Section 7 contains stakeholder comments on the Pilot; and Section 8 provides a summary and conclusions.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMIC PRICING PILOT

AgFIT has three key design elements in place to accomplish its goals:

1. Dynamic price signals, including the ability to schedule pumping at locked-in hourly prices up to seven days in advance, that incentivize load shifting to provide operational benefits and customer bill savings.

2. Automation incentives up to $200 per kW of shiftable load for remote control of irrigation systems.

3. Targeted marketing, education, and outreach (ME&O) and customer support.

In this section, we describe how dynamic prices were implemented in AgFIT, how the pricing method has changed over the course of the Pilot, and the shadow bill methodology. We then illustrate the prices observed to date and present information about the Pilot participants.

2.1 Pricing Method Description

The dynamic elements of published prices consist of two components: a generation rate component corresponding to the services provided by VCE; and a distribution rate component for the services provided by PG&E. VCE selected TeMix as the vendor to

[10] CPUC Decision 21-12-015, p. 94. There is a fifth requirement, as follows: "In the case that VCE incorporates binding forecast projections, the evaluation should also include an assessment of this element." However, VCE implemented "binding forecast projections" for all Pilot customers (i.e., there was no control group of customers presented with price forecasts with no opportunity to lock them in), so this requirement is met through the analysis of the response of agricultural loads to prices.

provide its proprietary cloud-hosted TeMix Platform™ that operates 24/7 to support the six steps of the CalFUSE framework itemized in Figure 2.1 below.[11]

Figure 2.1: CalFUSE Framework



A key input to the TeMix distribution rate component is week-ahead hourly circuit load forecasts, which are provided by PG&E through a third-party vendor. Week-ahead generation price forecasts are provided through a different third-party vendor.

The integration and automation of pumping loads with the Pilot price signals is through the equipment and related data integration provider (Automation Service Provider, or ASP) via its proprietary software. The ASP that was selected by VCE is Polaris. In this Pilot, "automation" was optional and, when used, meant that price forecasts were available for customers to view, who could control pumps manually or via remote control technology. The Pilot did not have pumps automatically controlled by the price signals themselves.

The Pilot was funded in June 2022 and launched on August 1, 2022.[12] The two-part tariff was approved and implemented for use from the third week of August 2022 to the end of April 2023. During that period, there were two customers with a total of 19 pumps. Starting in May 2023, the Pilot pricing method was changed from a two-part design to a one-part design, with the AgFIT price development, shadow billing and transactive responsibilities performed by Polaris while TeMix continued to provide hourly tenders up to a week ahead for each circuit used by pilot participants. The first phase of the AgFIT Pilot with a subscription priced at OAT rate levels and dynamic prices reflecting marginal (and other) costs is referred to as AgFIT 1.0 (August 2022 through April 2023); and the second phase with no subscription and dynamic prices scaled to OAT rate levels is referred to as AgFIT 2.0 (beginning May 1, 2023). The AgFIT 2.1 pricing method was

[11] The figure is taken from page 6 of the June 22, 2022 Energy Division white paper entitled "Advanced Strategies for Demand Flexibility Management and Customer DER Compensation".
[12] It is our understanding that it was an intense effort by the CPUC, VCE, PG&E, Polaris, and TeMix starting in early 2022, to get the Pilot approved, funded, contracted, and to standup all the teams to manage, deploy, configure, test, and securely operate 24/7 the multiple software platforms, cloud computing systems, pump controls, and interfaces to existing CAISO, near real-time metering, monthly billing data, and circuit forecasting and to recruit, train, and support customers to participate in the Pilot.

adopted on May 1, 2024, which is largely the same as the 2.0 pricing method but with some modifications described below.

AgFIT 1.0 Pricing

When the Pilot became active in August 2022, a two-part pricing method was employed. The customer is provided a subscription, which is a fixed quantity of energy per hour priced at OAT rates. The subscription hourly quantities (kWh) are based on the customer's usage in the same month of the previous year (2021).

The subscription price was developed by applying an escalation factor to the previous year's (2021) OAT bill. The escalation factors were fixed within a rate schedule and month based on class-average changes in bills across years. An alternative method (employed by SCE in its dynamic rate pilot) would have been to price the subscription by billing each customer's historical usage at current OAT rates. This would have done a better job of aligning the effect of rate changes with the customer's specific usage profile but would have required more time and data to implement. Therefore PG&E opted to use the simpler escalation method to allow the Pilot to proceed at an earlier date.

The subscription component of the bill serves two purposes. First, it reduces the customer's bill volatility due to dynamic prices, with the customer only paying (or being paid) those prices for usage that deviates from their subscription quantity.[13] In the extreme, a customer who uses exactly its subscription quantity during an hour will not pay the dynamic price at all. This risk mitigation can be especially important during extended periods of high dynamic prices. In addition to shielding some or all of a customer's usage from high prices, it also provides an opportunity for the customer to sell back some of its subscription at the locational dynamic prices, thus releasing energy for those who value it more.

Second, the subscription provides a means of linking the overall bill level to the OAT (and the revenue requirement assumed when the OAT for each rate class was established), thus preserving any rate class pricing differences. Because dynamic prices are intended to reflect the utility's retail locational marginal cost, in theory the deviations of the bill from the OAT-based subscription level should be matched by the avoided costs associated with the price response. However, a utility's average cost (total revenue requirement divided by total load) is almost always greater than the marginal cost. Thus, the Pilot cannot simply charge the marginal costs for all usage; it requires a mechanism to collect the non-marginal "missing money" to meet the revenue requirement, at least approximately. This was accomplished via subscription charges and adders to hourly prices based on non-marginal costs. The dynamic prices in AgFIT 1.0 recover some non-marginal costs using scarcity pricing in which more of the costs are recovered when net loads[14] or the net load ramp is high and less when they are low. The rest of the non-marginal costs such as public purpose charges and transmission charges are recovered in a flat $/kWh adder that is included in the dynamic prices.

[13] In contrast, under a "one-part" real-time pricing program, the customer pays the hourly price for all usage in the hour.
[14] Net load is the CAISO load less the solar plus wind generation. Net load ramp is a positive difference between the net load for the hour and the net load three hours earlier.

In a simple two-part pricing rate, the customer pays for deviations from their subscription quantity at hourly prices that reflect market conditions.[15] This is reflected in the simplified bill calculation for month *m* below (where *i* indexes all hours during the month):

$$\text{Two-part Pricing Bill}_m = \Sigma_i \{(P^{Sub}_i \times Q^{Sub}_i) + P^{Dyn}_i \times (Q^{Obs}_i - Q^{Sub}_i)\}$$

Table 2.1: Variables in a Two-Part Pricing Bill Calculation

Variable	Description
P^{Sub}_i	Subscription price during time interval *i* in $/kWh
Q^{Sub}_i	Subscription quantity during time interval *i* in kWh
P^{Dyn}_i	Dynamic price during time interval *i* in $/kWh
Q^{Obs}_i	Observed (metered) usage during time interval *i* in kWh

The settlement process is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, which is taken from the Energy Division's "Advanced Strategies for Demand Flexibility Management and Customer DER Compensation" white paper.[16] In the figure, the "CalFUSE rate" is synonymous with the dynamic settlement price used in AgFIT 1.0.

[15] These prices can be guaranteed up to seven days ahead, day-ahead, hour-ahead, or only known after the fact.

[16] "Advanced Strategies for Demand Flexibility Management and Customer DER Compensation" Energy Division White Paper, page 67: ED-White-Paper-Advanced-Strategies-for-Demand-Flexibility-Management-June-2022.pdf (dret-ca.com)

Figure 2.2: Example Showing the Subscription as a Hedging Product



In addition to the elements described above, the Pilot offers additional opportunities for customers to lock in the prices paid for scheduled load (or received for subscription amounts that will be unused) up to six days ahead of time. Specifically, each day the customer is presented with six days of hourly dynamic "tender prices". The customer can choose to schedule a pump to run or not run for any hour in that six-day window. Once scheduled, the difference between the customer's current position (i.e., the sum of customer's subscription quantity in that hour and previous transactions for that hour) and the usage scheduled for that hour is purchased or sold in a transaction at the dynamic tender price. The price and quantity are fixed and guaranteed by the transaction. The transactions are essentially adjustments to the customer's "forward contract" (i.e., the energy that has been pre-purchased) priced at the dynamic tender prices.

The final settlement for any given hour reflects the following three components:

- The subscription quantity purchased at subscription prices;
- Purchases or sales of fixed quantities of energy at dynamic tender prices; and
- The purchase or sale of the difference between the customer's metered net load and the net transacted quantity at ex-post prices.

The dynamic tender prices are set to recover the marginal energy costs, which reflect CAISO locational marginal prices (LMPs); long-run generation capacity marginal costs; long-run distribution capacity marginal costs; and other non-marginal revenue components and policy costs currently included in the approved revenue requirements of PG&E.

AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 Pricing

The AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods replace the two-part pricing method described above with a one-part method that uses only dynamic tenders, i.e., subscriptions were eliminated. While the customer does not purchase a subscription at OAT-based prices, the 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods link Pilot price levels to OAT levels by shifting the prices of the dynamic tenders from the TeMix Platform™ up or down so a pump's average price matches its rate schedule's average OAT price. In addition, the customers are allowed to purchase fixed quantities of electricity at these binding dynamic adjusted tenders up to seven days in advance; this feature is similar to AgFIT 1.0 pricing. The extension of the tenders from six to seven days in advance is unrelated to the change to AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1.

Under the AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 "one-part" pricing programs, the customer pays the day-ahead hourly price for all of its usage in the hour unless the customer purchases two to seven days ahead at the forward adjusted dynamic prices. Any difference between the net sum of the forward transactions and the actual meter reading is automatically transacted at the day-ahead price.

The AgFIT 2.0 dynamic prices are adjusted by comparing the weekly average dynamic prices (i.e., the upcoming 168 hourly prices that would have served as the dynamic prices under AgFIT 1.0) to the seasonal average price paid per kWh for the customer's OAT. The OAT value is calculated at the rate schedule level and therefore could differ from the AgFIT customer's historical or current average OAT price. The AgFIT 2.0 rate adjustment is constant across all hours of the week, equal to the difference between the average OAT price and the average of the (unadjusted) dynamic prices. The averaging is conducted daily.

Another change to the pricing methodology occurred at the same time AgFIT 2.0 was implemented. Specifically, non-marginal generation costs that had been recovered using a dynamic scarcity price were changed to be recovered on a flat cents/kWh basis. This change is unrelated to the other methodological changes but has the effect of reducing the potential for customers to benefit from shifting usage by lowering intra-day price differences.

In contrast to AgFIT 2.0, under AgFIT 2.1 the dynamic prices are adjusted by comparing the weekly average dynamic prices for the prior and coming week (i.e., a two-week average rather than the one-week average used in AgFIT 2.0). As with AgFIT 2.0, rate adjustment is constant across all hours of the week, equal to the difference between the average OAT price and the average of the (unadjusted) dynamic prices. The averaging is conducted daily. In addition, the scarcity pricing method used in AgFIT 2.1 to allocate distribution and generation capacity costs across hours uses a sigmoidal method that replaces the quadratic method used in AgFIT 2.0. The 2.1 pricing method also introduces a threshold CAISO net load level (approximately 28 GW) below which the capacity cost assigned to the hour is zero.

Table 2.2 summarizes the differences between the AgFIT pricing methods. The primary difference is the removal of the fixed-quantity subscription in AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 and the resulting need to implement an alternative method to recover OAT-level embedded costs (the flat adder).

Table 2.2: Comparison of AgFIT 1.0, 2.0, and 2.1

Characteristic	AgFIT 1.0	AgFIT 2.0	AgFIT 2.1
Has a subscription?	Yes	No	No
Basis for OAT-level Revenue	Fixed-quantity subscription priced at customer's historical OAT with an escalator	Flat $/kWh adder to dynamic prices based on the rate schedule's seasonal average price paid per kWh	Flat $/kWh adder to dynamic prices based on the rate schedule's seasonal average price paid per kWh
Averaging period for dynamic price adjustments	N/A	7 previous days	7 previous and 7 future days
Ability to transact for fixed quantities at a guaranteed dynamic price?[17]	Yes, up to 6 days ahead	Yes, up to 6 days ahead	Yes, up to 7 days ahead
Recovery of non-marginal generation costs[18]	Dynamic and Flat $/kWh	Flat $/kWh	Flat $/kWh
Distribution and Generation Capacity Cost Allocation Method	Quadratic	Quadratic	Sigmoidal
Effective Dates	8/2022 – 4/2023	5/2023 – 4/2024	4/2024 – 12/2024

Shadow Bill Credit Method

According to the Decision, the shadow bill approach was adopted "to address PG&E's and CLECA's objections about the revenue neutrality of the VCE Pilot rate."[19] Under this method, the customer continues to pay for its current usage at the OAT rates (e.g., Schedule AG-C), which did not require changes to PG&E's billing systems for the Pilot. For each month and service account (pump), the difference between the OAT bill and the AgFIT charges is recorded. At the end of a period of time[20], the monthly credits or debits are added up for each service account to determine whether a credit is paid to the customer. For any given service account, the customer is eligible to receive a credit if the sum of the AgFIT charges is less than the sum of the OAT bills. In contrast, if the sum of the AgFIT charges is greater than the sum of the OAT bills, the customer is not responsible for paying an additional amount beyond their OAT bills for that service account.

The equation below shows the calculation of the dynamic bill credit for service account s during months m.

$$\text{Dynamic Pilot Credit}_s = \text{MAX}\{\Sigma_m(\text{OAT Bill}_{s,m} - \text{AgFIT Charges}_{s,m}), 0\}$$

In the equation, MAX is the maximum function, Σ_m is the summation function, "OAT $\text{Bill}_{s,m}$" is service account *s*'s bill on their OAT using metered usage during month *m*, and "AgFIT $\text{Charges}_{s,m}$" is service account *s*'s AgFIT charges during month *m*.

Note that service accounts belonging to a customer are treated distinctly for these calculations. That is, a customer could earn a credit for one service account that is not offset by a debit for another.

Customer Impacts of the Shadow Bill Credit Method

It is important to understand the shadow bill credit method as we discuss customer load and bill impacts during the Pilot. While a purported benefit of AgFIT pricing is that customers no longer need to consider the OAT demand charges[21], customers who increase their billed demand will pay the higher OAT bill associated with that change versus what they would have paid prior to the Pilot. At the end of a year, they will be eligible for a credit if their total AgFIT charges are less than the total OAT bill. This methodology may lead participants to view the Pilot negatively in real time (i.e., because they pay higher OAT bills relative to pre-Pilot months even as they are responding to dynamic prices). Perhaps more importantly, if the Pilot pricing method does not present the customer with sufficient opportunities to save each month (e.g., due to a lack of dynamic price variation), the customer could end up paying more by having ignored the OAT price signals.

Conversely, a customer who reduces their OAT bill relative to pre-Pilot levels by responding to dynamic prices may not receive a shadow bill credit even though responding to the Pilot prices benefited them. For example, if dynamic prices are consistently high during the OAT's Peak pricing period, the customer may decrease its OAT billed demand by responding to dynamic prices which could result in reducing the OAT bill to a level lower than the AgFIT charges.[22] This is important to keep in mind when we examine bill impacts in Section 5. A customer who does not receive a Pilot credit still may have saved money relative to pre-Pilot levels. There is evidence to suggest at least some of the customers understood these concepts (i.e., the importance of continuing to pay attention to OAT prices during the Pilot), though there was likely variation in the level of understanding.

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[17] The change allowing customers to transact seven days ahead instead of six occurred at the time AgFIT 2.1 pricing was adopted but is not otherwise related to the removal of fixed-quantity subscription pricing.

[18] This change occurred at the time AgFIT 2.0 pricing was adopted but is not otherwise related to the removal of the subscription.

[19] CPUC Decision 21-12-015, p. 91.

[20] The three credit periods used in the Pilot were August 2022 to April 2022, May 2023 to September 2023, and October 2023 to December 2024.

[21] VCE's web page promoting AgFIT lists the following among the program benefits: "There are no penalties, no demand charges, and no clawbacks." https://valleycleanenergy.org/programs/a-flexible-irrigation-pilot-program-for-agriculture/

[22] The customer could have responded to the OAT prices to reduce their bills by the same amount. But perhaps the customer would be more engaged with and able to respond to OAT and dynamic prices during the Pilot, and thus their savings are due to paying attention more than the dynamic prices or shadow billing process.

2.2 Observed Dynamic Prices

Figures 2.3 through 2.5 illustrate the average hourly "last rate" (the day-ahead dynamic tender price) by month of the growing season (May through September) in each year of the Pilot. The blue bars reflect the average daily price (i.e., the simple average across 24 hours), while the orange dots reflect the maximum hourly price, and the yellow dots reflect the minimum hourly price on each date. In each case, the prices reflect the average across customers enrolled at that time.

Figure 2.3 shows high maximum prices in early September 2022 surrounded by more moderate prices. Note that this figure shows data beginning in mid-August (corresponding to the beginning of the customer participation in the Pilot), whereas the subsequent figures show data beginning in May.

Figure 2.3: Average and Maximum Daily Day-Ahead Prices, 2022 Growing Season



Figure 2.4 shows that the highest prices of the 2023 growing season occurred in mid-August. Moderate prices were in effect from May into July and again in September, with July having some slightly higher price days.

Figure 2.4: Average and Maximum Daily Day-Ahead Prices, 2023 Growing Season



Figure 2.5 shows that the highest prices of the entire Pilot occurred on September 5, 2024, with somewhat high price spikes occurring on the two neighboring dates. More moderate price spikes (around $1 per kWh) occurred on July 11 and August 27, 2024. The difference between the highest and lowest daily prices is lower in 2024 than 2023 (averaging $0.19 per kWh in 2023 and $0.14 per kWh in 2024).

Figure 2.5: Average and Maximum Daily Day-Ahead Prices, 2024 Growing Season



The figures above reflect average prices across enrolled customers. However, the price can vary across customers due to location (i.e., because of differences in loads across circuits and the pNODE price) and because of the pump's OAT rate, which serves as the basis for hourly price adjustments in 2023 and 2024. The next figure explores how prices vary across customers.

Figure 2.6 shows the variation in prices across customers during the highest-priced hours. We selected the eight highest-priced hours and graphed the prices on each date. For example, on September 5, 2024, which had the highest prices overall, the pump-specific prices ranged from $2.28 to $2.62 per kWh. On average, the prices differed by $0.34 per kWh from lowest to highest on each date, with the largest difference ($0.53 per kWh) occurring on September 4, 2024. This shows that high-price hours applied to all customers, even though the exact magnitude of the price varied across customers.

Figure 2.6: Price Distribution Across Pumps on High-Price Days



The next set of figures shows the average hourly price profile for different time periods. We use a box-whisker format[23] to provide an indication of the variability around the typical price profile.

Figure 2.7 shows the hourly distribution of day-ahead dynamic tender prices for AgFIT 2.0 (May through September 2023). As expected, prices increase during evening hours. The variance on the upper bound is also largest during the early evening hours, peaking from 6 to 8 p.m. The morning hours exhibit lower prices and a reduced range relative to the evening hours.

[23] A box-whisker plot illustrates different elements regarding the distribution of prices. The shaded box area represents prices that fall within the 25th and 75th percentile of observations (i.e., the interquartile range). The horizontal line within the box indicates the median price. The "whiskers" represent the lower and upper bounds of prices that are not considered outliers – i.e., not more than 1.5 times the interquartile range away from the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range.

Figure 2.7: Distribution of Hourly Day-Ahead Dynamic Prices, May-Sep 2023



Figure 2.8 shows the same information for the 2024 growing season. While the highest-priced hours are still from 6 to 8 p.m., the overall price profile is both flatter and with less variability around the median values.

Figure 2.8: Distribution of Hourly Day-Ahead Dynamic Prices, May-Sep 2024



Figure 2.9 compares the distribution of hourly day-ahead dynamic tender prices between August 2022, which employed AgFIT 1.0 pricing, and August 2023, which employed AgFIT 2.0 pricing. The August 2023 AgFIT 2.0 prices are higher than August 2022 AgFIT 1.0 prices during the morning hours but lower during evening hours. The overall result is less intra-day price variation under AgFIT 2.0, resulting in a lower peak to off-peak period price differential relative to AgFIT 1.0. While the pricing method changed across the two periods, other factors also affected the price level and pattern. For example, the CAISO locational marginal prices (LMP) that serve as an input to the AgFIT prices were generally lower in 2023 than 2022, with lower price differentials. Figure 2.10 illustrates the

distribution of CAISO LMPs for August 2022 and 2023.[24] (Please note the change in the y-axis scale relative to Figure 2.9 when making comparisons.)

Figure 2.9: Distribution of Hourly Day-Ahead Dynamic Prices, August 2022 vs 2023



Figure 2.10: Distribution of Hourly CAISO LMPs, August 2022 vs 2023



Figure 2.11 uses the same format as Figure 2.9 to compare prices in August 2023 and 2024. The insights from the entire growing season hold when looking only at August: the price profile in 2024 was flatter and less volatile than it was in 2023, further differentiating it from the prices in 2022 (when two-part pricing was in effect).

[24] Specifically, the figure summarizes hourly real-time market prices for the Aggregated Pricing Node PGAE.

Figure 2.11: Distribution of Hourly Day-Ahead Dynamic Prices, August 2023 vs 2024



While the discussion above focuses on day-ahead dynamic prices, customers were provided dynamic price tenders up to seven days ahead of time. It may be instructive to illustrate how the tenders for the highest priced hours changed over time.

Figure 2.12 shows the tenders across notice levels for five high-priced hours during 2023 and 2024, with the 2023 days represented by dashed lines.[25] The figure shows a notable difference in the evolution of prices across notice levels across years. In 2023, the price spike only showed up one day ahead of delivery. In contrast, the 2024 prices were somewhat high across all notice levels, though there was some variation across them.

Our understanding is that the third-party vendor used to provide forecasts prior to the day-ahead (when CAISO market prices are used) changed in 2024, perhaps leading to an improvement in forecasting constrained conditions more than one day ahead of delivery.

[25] The figure shows prices averaged across the customers enrolled in the Pilot at the time.

Figure 2.12: Price Evolution for Select Days in 2023 and 2024



A potential implication of the figure is that prior to 2024, customers who planned pump activity two or more days in advance (and did not revisit their decision later) may not have been aware of when prices were at their highest. Our interviews confirmed that at least some customers were not aware that high-price hours occurred in 2022 and 2023.

2.3 Participant Summary

The customers enrolled in the Pilot are a mix of small, medium, and large agricultural customers that employ irrigation pumps to water different types of crops. The Pilot does not have a limit on the number of customers if the aggregate peak load of Pilot customers does not exceed 5 MW. Most enrolled Pilot customers have multiple pumps (service accounts). Figure 2.13 depicts the number of customers and pumps enrolled in the Pilot. There were two customers with a combined total of 17 pumps in September 2022. By September 2023, the enrollment count increased to five customers with a combined total of 33 pumps. In September 2024, seven customers were enrolled with a total of 60 pumps.[26]

[26] The figure shows the count of pumps with usage in that month, which is sometimes less than the number of enrolled pumps.

Figure 2.13: Enrollment Customer and Pump Counts



Table 2.3 provides characteristics information for each enrolled Pilot customer, including their start date, number of pumps, and usage. Note that we have anonymized the customer names in the interest of confidentiality. The two largest customers account for 62% of the enrolled pumps and 70% of the enrolled load (by PLUM kW).[27]

Table 2.3: Pilot Customer Characteristics

Customer	Start Date	# Pumps	# NEM Pumps	PLUM kW	NCP Max kW
C-001	8/1/2022	21	10	1,482	1,875
C-002	8/1/2022	9	3	362	463
C-003	11/11/2022	16	0	1,040	1,661
C-004	7/27/2023	9	0	420	426
C-005	5/27/2023	2	0	146	166
C-006	5/1/2024	2	0	106	115
C-007	6/10/2024	1	0	53	4
Total		**60**	**13**	**3,609**	**4,711**

[27] The "NCP Max kW" value indicates the non-coincident peak (NCP) for each pump, summed across pumps within each customer. Therefore, the total NCP Max kW value will not equal the maximum demand for the Pilot's aggregate load. The "PLUM kW" value uses the Peak Load Under Management (PLUM) methodology, calculated as the average load of each pump after removing hours when the pump is not running. The PLUM values can change over time. This is the measure that VCE used to track the kW enrolled in the Pilot.

Agricultural pumping loads vary by season. Figure 2.14 depicts the average usage per pump for each month.[28] Energy use ramps up during May, is comparatively high from June through August, and then declines during September. April and October appear to be shoulder periods when relatively little pumping is employed. Customer energy use is minimal from November through March.

Figure 2.14: Program Average Monthly Usage by Pump



Figures 2.15 through 2.23 show the average hourly usage from May through September for each customer, with separate profiles by year and enrollment status. Each profile represents the total across the applicable pumps (enrolled and not enrolled by year). The dashed lines reflect pre-Pilot (unenrolled) loads, and the solid lines represent enrolled loads. Note that not all combinations of enrollment status and year are available for every customer (e.g., some customers have no enrolled pumps in 2022 or 2023, and no customers have enrolled pumps in 2021). These figures provide an illustration of typical usage patterns under Pilot and pre-Pilot pricing. One feature to look for in each figure is the extent to which the customer appears to be managing peak-period usage in response to OAT demand charges. As we will describe below, two customers are notable in this regard.

Customer C-001's pumps are divided into two figures. Figure 2.15 shows the pumps that were actively managed by the customer, while Figure 2.16 shows three pumps that were not managed to Pilot prices, according to our interview with the customer. Figure 2.15 shows that the pre-Pilot load profiles were flat across the hours of the day, except for 2022. In Section 4.2, we will describe how the "notch" from hours-ending 18 to 20 likely reflects the use of automation to respond to OAT TOU incentives. The Pilot load profiles show less usage during (and near) peak-period hours, though the "notching" seen in the 2022 pre-Pilot loads is not present.

[28] Because the composition of customers changes over time, the average usage per pump between months is not directly comparable in this figure.

Figure 2.15: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-001 Managed



Figure 2.16 shows the load profiles for three pumps that customer C-001 was not managing to Pilot prices.[29] The figure reflects this, with no large differences in profiles by enrollment status.

[29] Customer C-001 had six pumps that had difficulty getting automation installed. The customer intended to respond to prices with these pumps at the time of enrollment, but the lack of automation did not allow it.

Figure 2.16: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-001 Not Managed



Figure 2.17 shows that customer C-002 also had the peak-period notch in the 2022 pre-Pilot load profile. This will also be described further in Section 4.2. Compared to the 2021 pre-Pilot load profile, the Pilot load profiles show relatively less usage during the higher-cost hours of the day (around HE 18 to 20), perhaps indicating price response.

Figure 2.17: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-002



Figure 2.18 shows that customer C-003 manages peak-period usage regardless of whether they are on the Pilot. This has an important implication for analyses of their price responsiveness, which is that it is more likely to occur during off-peak hours. That is, the

customer responds to the OAT rate's demand charge during peak hours on an everyday basis, regardless of the dynamic price levels. However, they may be more responsive to variations in off-peak dynamic prices.[30]

Figure 2.18: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-003



Figure 2.19 shows some evidence of customer C-004 managing peak-period demands (most notably in the 2021 pre-Pilot usage profile), but in general usage appears to be more concentrated in the daytime hours.

[30] Note that the pumps reflected in this figure are served on Schedule AG-C, which has a high summer Peak-period demand charge that gives the customer a strong incentive to avoid using during that pricing period.

Figure 2.19: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-004



Figure 2.20 shows the usage profiles for the pump that customer C-005 actively managed. The most important point to note is that the customer never used energy from HE 17 to 21 during 2023 and 2024. During our interview, the customer said they continued to respond to OAT demand charges, but did play close attention to dynamic prices in other hours. We will find some evidence of this in our price response analyses.

Figure 2.20: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-005 Managed



Figure 2.21 shows the usage profiles for the pump that customer C-005 leased to another Pilot participant. According to customer C-005 in our interview, the customer managing

this pump was not actively responding to dynamic prices. According to information conveyed by Polaris, the pump was rarely needed during the Pilot due to high surface water allocations. The relatively flat Pilot load profiles reflect the lack of price response, though the overall load level during Pilot years is low relative to pre-Pilot usage in 2021, supporting Polaris's information that pumping needs were not very high for this pump while it was enrolled in the Pilot.

Figure 2.21: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-005 Leased



Figure 2.22 shows the usage profiles for customer C-006. The load profile during the Pilot period seems fundamentally different from the pre-Pilot loads. Given that some low-priced hours (e.g., HE 1-6) have lower usage during the Pilot, the shape differences may reflect differences in pumping needs across years rather than a response to Pilot prices.

Figure 2.22: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-006



Figure 2.23 shows the usage profiles for customer C-007. Note that the load level is very low for this customer compared to other enrolled customers, peaking around 2.5 kWh/hour. The load shape is consistent across years and enrollment statuses, with pumping concentrated from HE 7-17, though the overall usage level varies.

Figure 2.23: Average Hourly Usage by Year and Enrollment Status, C-007



3 PARTICIPANT INTERVIEWS

Pilot participants were interviewed on two occasions during the Pilot. The first two customers to participate in the Pilot were interviewed by Polaris following the 2022 growing season. In August 2024, three customers participating during AgFIT 2.0 were interviewed.[31] The two sets of interviews are described in the sub-sections below.

3.1 Participant Interviews Following the 2022 Growing Season

Polaris provided us with video interviews of the two customers enrolled during AgFIT 1.0: customers C-001 and C-002. The interviews took place on December 15, 2022; therefore, the discussions focused on usage differences in 2022 versus 2021 due to installed automation technology more than due to dynamic pricing. There was only a limited period when customers were actively pumping and under AgFIT 1.0 pricing. Nevertheless, we summarize parts of the interview here since it provided insights into views regarding technology as well as factors that affect pumping behavior.

Customer C-001 had nine pumps installed during the AgFIT 1.0 summer period. While reviewing reductions during the TOU peak period for the months May through September in 2022, customer C-001 mentioned that the automation technology was the biggest factor contributing to the reduction. Higher prices were also a factor but not as much as the automation because by that point they had only received prices for a short period of time (August and September 2022) for a few of their pumps. Before having automation technology installed, customer C-001 knew when the TOU peak period was; however, it was difficult to avoid the peak period because it required sending out an employee to shut off the pump at the beginning and turn it back on at the end. Labor availability and additional overtime costs thus increased the costs to avoid the peak period.

During the interview, customer C-001 discussed pumping less in 2022 than the previous year. They indicated that the amount of surface water wasn't the cause of the difference, but crop rotation was. For example, the amount of TOU response is dependent on the crop type because specific crops need more water; therefore, the pump's response to TOU pricing is not as steep. In discussing the upcoming year (2023 at the time), customer C-001 indicated that the coming year's crops would require more irrigation.

Customer C-002 had eight pumps on the Pilot during the 2022 period. Customer C-002 indicated that in 2021, before installing automation technology, they would run their pumps regardless of the TOU peak period because of the labor challenges associated with changing employees in and out. In general pump usage was less in 2022 than in 2021 but there was also a TOU peak period reduction because of the automation. Customer C-002 suggested that the reduced usage in 2022 was due to having more control over when pumping was dispatched.[32] The automation technology allowed the ability to track

[31] We attempted to interview all five customers who participated in AgFIT 2.0 but were only able to schedule interviews with three of them.

[32] Customer C-002 indicated that crop rotation and surface water levels wouldn't have been the cause of the reduction.

pumps without having to send laborers out to the locations. This ability helped reduce errors due to not knowing whether the pump was incorrectly on/off.

Similar to the customer C-001 interview, customer C-002 indicated that the automation technology was convenient for employees to not have to go turn pumps on/off. TOU without automation was inconvenient and not worth the savings to avoid the peak period because of the additional labor costs. Customer C-002 indicated that there can be a negative side to the automation technology, that is, employees can become comfortable with the technology and assume it is working without checking it.

Customer C-002 mentioned some things that were instructive regarding how they respond to dynamic pricing and the platform. First, they indicated that they wanted the scheduling platform to have the ability to view weeks Monday through Sunday to better match their planning period.[33] Second, customer C-002 indicated that while some pumps run all the time, their plan was still to avoid specific high price thresholds (e.g., $0.30/kWh). However, if overall price levels increased, the customer's price threshold would also increase if there was a need to get a certain number of pumping hours – in other words, the price threshold was essentially a way to get the pumps to run during the lowest-priced hours while still pumping the required hours per week. This provides evidence that price thresholds are used by the customer to manage price responsiveness.

3.2 Participant Interviews During the 2024 Growing Season

Three customers were interviewed in August 2024: C-001, C-003, and C-005. A presentation was provided to the customer prior to the interview to help guide the discussion. It included the following elements:

- Comparisons of average hourly usage in 2022 and 2023: facilitated discussions of differences in usage across hours and years.
- Pump scheduling decisions: encourage customers to describe when/how they scheduled pumping.
- Effects of Pilot technology and pricing: discuss whether/how operations were affected by automation and/or dynamic pricing.
- Review usage on the highest-priced days in 2023 (August 15-16) to explore customer awareness of and response to high prices.
- Show shadow bill credits during AgFIT 2.0 and ask about alignment with the customer's expectations.
- Conclude with open-ended questions about their overall views of the Pilot.

The following key points emerged from the discussions:

- Pumping needs can vary significantly across years due to factors such as changing hydrological conditions or crop rotation. In addition, pumps frequently have operational constraints that could prevent the customer from responding to prices. This can include needing to run 24/7, not needing to run at all, or having

[33] This feature was added to the interface based on this feedback from the customer.

minimum run times (e.g., a minimum of six consecutive hours to meet the crop's needs).

- Automation allowed the customers to take advantage of TOU and dynamic pricing. Prior to automation, it was difficult to have people available to manually turn pumps on and off to match the TOU pricing periods. However, even with automation, some labor is required to inspect the pumps for proper operation (e.g., checking for leaks and confirming flow rates).
- One customer used automation from a vendor other than Polaris and reported no problems in using the technology in combination with Polaris's scheduling software.
- One customer noted that automation was expensive and he would not have been able to adopt it without the Pilot incentives.
- Customer scheduling behavior varied. C-001 primarily scheduled on Sunday and did not revisit prices later in the week. He tried to concentrate pumping on weekends when prices were lowest. C-003 would schedule in two blocks: Saturday through Monday and then for Monday through Friday. He was not concerned about prices changing during the week, particularly during "must-run" times. C-005 checked prices at least once a week and typically more often than that. He usually scheduled pumping on the day-of or a day ahead.
- Customers reported differences in behavior in 2023 and 2024. The lower price differentials in 2024 gave them less incentive to pay close attention to prices. One customer reported trying to take full advantage of negative prices in 2023 (even when it was not necessarily in the best interest of the trees in the orchard), but did not see negative prices in 2024.
- Customers did not recall being aware of the highest-price days in 2022 and 2023. One customer had no need for pumping at the time of a price spike and therefore he wasn't paying attention to prices. Customer C-005 was already responding to OAT demand charges by avoiding pumping during the peak-period and thus would not have been concerned about high dynamic prices in those hours.
- One customer reported that it's easier to respond in spring when there's plenty of water, but harder to be flexible later in the growing season.
- Customers wanted more frequent and comprehensive feedback. It was difficult for them to connect their actions with bill savings. It would be easier to learn what works if they received more frequent feedback.
- Two customers reported that they continued to manage usage in response to the OAT demand charge (i.e., avoiding use from 5 to 8 p.m.), while a third said he primarily looked at hourly prices but also considered OAT prices when scheduling usage.
- All three customers were generally happy with the Pilot but would like to learn more about the benefits they get from the extra work it takes to schedule usage with dynamic prices. One expressed concern that his pumps are not flexible enough to make it worthwhile in the long run and thought that the most flexible pumps (even at other farms or orchards) might be the smaller ones, with a corresponding reduction in the scale of the potential benefits of the pricing method.

- Customer C-005 has recommended the Pilot to others and likes the pricing from a conceptual perspective. However, he thinks many farmers will have less flexibility than he does, and he noted that it is easier to manage usage on a TOU rate. Pilot participation required a significant time commitment. There's complexity in dealing with prices while dealing with operational constraints.
- Customer C-003 reported that price differences need to be large enough to make shifting worthwhile.

4 EVALUATION OF LOAD RESPONSIVENESS

4.1 Overview of Methodologies and Results

In this section, we evaluate whether and how customers changed their usage while on the Pilot. Several methods are employed, including:

- Comparisons of pre-Pilot and Pilot loads;
- Comparisons of Pilot usage on high-price and comparison days; and
- Statistical analyses of changes in usage in response to dynamic prices.

The analyses are limited to months when Pilot customers have demand for pumping (August and September 2022 for AgFIT 1.0; and May through September for AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1).

The findings indicate the following:

- Comparisons of pre-Pilot to Pilot hourly usage profiles for the first two enrolled customers provide evidence of changes in typical customer usage patterns once automation is introduced, with the response occurring under both TOU and dynamic pricing.
- Comparisons of usage profiles on high-price and comparison days provide mixed evidence of larger price response on higher-priced days. In some cases, there did not appear to be usage to curtail during the high-price hours (either because the customer didn't need to pump at all that day or because they were already avoiding the TOU peak period due to the OAT demand charge). In other cases, the differences in loads across day types was consistent with price response. Some customers had load differences that were not consistent with price differences and thus were likely due to differences in pumping needs across days, unrelated to price.
- The statistical analysis, which examines customer responses to Pilot dynamic prices, found evidence that two customers responded to prices during off-peak hours, but did not respond during peak hours. This is consistent with our interviews with one of them, which indicated everyday management of peak

usage in response to the OAT demand charge, but response to prices in other hours.

4.2 Pre-Pilot Versus Pilot Usage Comparisons

One potential measure of the Pilot's effect is to compare typical usage profiles prior to the Pilot to those during the Pilot. However, simple comparisons of pre-Pilot and in-Pilot usage patterns are likely to be misleading when applied to agricultural pumping customers. That is, a pump's usage can vary significantly across years due to changes in hydrological conditions and crop rotations. To illustrate how overall pumping demand can vary across years, we graphed average usage per pump during the May to September growing season for the pumps that enrolled in the Pilot at some point.

Figure 4.1 shows how pumping needs varied from 2021 through 2024. All pumps are reflected in each year, with the share of enrolled load increasing from 0% in 2021 to nearly 100% in 2024 (not all pumps were enrolled for the entire summer of 2024). Customer C-003 told us that their energy needs were much higher in 2022 than 2023, requiring them to use approximately 25% more energy in 2022.[34] This is reflected in the figure, with average use per pump falling by 39% from 2022 to 2023. Because of these differences across years, we do not believe the evaluation of price response should be based on pre-Pilot vs. in-Pilot usage comparisons.

Figure 4.1: Average Usage by Pump from May to September by Year



[34] According to Polaris, the difference in usage across years is due to a very dry winter before the 2022 growing season causing: 1) more pumping to be necessary; 2) water tables to be lower so pumping required more energy; and 3) low or no surface water allocation. This contrasted with a very wet winter prior to the 2023 growing season, almost reversing the effects of the prior winter: 1) more surface water allocations leading to less reliance on well pumping; and 2) more rain leading to higher water tables so less energy to pump when the wells were needed.

That said, there is one comparison we can make that provides some anecdotal evidence of the effect of automation on TOU price response. Specifically, two Pilot customers, C-001 and C-002, had automation technology installed on pumps that were on time-of-use (TOU) pricing before being introduced to dynamic pricing.[35] This allowed us to compare how usage changed between technology and price regimes; first with no automation technology but TOU prices, second with automation technology and TOU prices, and third with automation technology but now with dynamic prices. The automation technology was installed in July 2022 while dynamic pricing went into effect in August 2022 for these customers' pumps. Therefore, the month of July between the years 2021 through 2023 can be used to compare usage under the different technology and price regimes. Again, it is important to note that other factors can affect usage levels and patterns across years, including variations in the planted crops and differences in hydrological conditions.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the average hourly usage for customer C-001's pumps that had automated technology installed before receiving dynamic prices. July usage is shown for the years 2021 through 2023. The 2021 usage (blue line) remained relatively flat throughout the day and therefore did not include a reduction during the TOU peak period (HE 18-20). The 2022 usage (orange line) represents usage when the customer's pumps had automation technology but were still under TOU pricing. There is a noticeable decrease in 2022 usage during the peak TOU period relative to 2021. The comparison between 2021 without technology and 2022 with technology is suggestive that the automation technology helped the customer respond to the TOU peak period. The 2023 usage (green line) represents when the customer's pumps had automation technology and faced AgFIT 2.0 pricing. Compared to 2022, the usage in 2023 illustrates a wider reduction around and after the TOU peak period, though at a lower magnitude. The 2023 usage pattern aligns with the AgFIT 2.0 price pattern (see Figure 2.7).[36] Therefore, the automation technology appears to also have helped the customer respond to dynamic prices.

[35] There were eleven pumps between the two customers that fall into this category.

[36] From Figure 2.7, the highest average prices occurred about an hour later than the 5-8 p.m. Ag peak period (the highest prices were HE 19-21, e.g., 6-9 PM). Likewise, the usage reductions under AgFIT 2.0 pricing were shifted later in the day compared to the TOU-based reductions. Aggregate decreases below the mid-day "baseline" (i.e., total reductions over all hours from 2 p.m. to midnight) were also greater under AgFIT 2.0 than under TOU rates.

Figure 4.2: Automation and Pricing Regime Usage, C-001



Figure 4.3 contains the same July comparisons for customer C-002's qualifying pumps. The 2021 usage without technology is relatively flat with no reduction during the TOU peak period. In contrast, the introduction of automation technology under TOU prices, reflected in the orange 2022 line, shows a reduction during the TOU peak period. The usage in 2023, when the customer faced AgFIT 2.0 prices, also exhibits a reduction during the TOU peak period but is again later, spread out in the surrounding hours, and greater in overall magnitude. The comparison between usage under the different technology and price regimes is suggestive that the automation technology was useful to enable load response to both TOU and dynamic pricing.

Figure 4.3: Automation and Pricing Regime Usage, C-002



Taken together, these comparisons provide evidence of changes in typical customer usage patterns once automation is introduced, with the response occurring under both TOU and dynamic pricing.

4.3 Comparisons by Price Day Types

In this section we discuss results from comparisons between usage on high-price days and a set of comparison days. The analysis is completed for the August and September 2022 period when AgFIT 1.0 was in place, the May through September 2023 period when AgFIT 2.0 prices were in place, and the May through September 2024 period when AgFIT 2.1 prices were in place.

The set of comparison days is intended to serve as a counterfactual and indicate what the customer loads would have been if the dynamic prices had not increased above typical levels. Importantly, the two sets of days should be somewhat close to each other in time because the demand for pumping varies over the season. This comparison can illustrate the extent to which customer behavior changes across price day types. However, pumping needs can change across days for reasons we don't know, which affects our ability to attribute differences in usage profiles to dynamic prices.

We selected "high-priced" days as the days with the highest single-hour prices. However, it was the case that the two dates in each growing season that had the highest maximum price also had the highest average daily price. The following three figures highlight the dates selected as high-priced days and comparison days. The blue bars represent the average daily price while the red dots represent a maximum price for each date. The orange bars mark the days that have the highest average and maximum prices during each year. The selected comparison days are depicted by the green bars. Comparison days were selected to match the day of week for the high-priced days, be near the high-price dates, and have typical (rather than high) price levels.[37] As will be shown in the customer-specific hourly figures below, the two day types tend to have similar prices during the overnight and morning hours. The higher prices are limited to afternoon and evening hours.

Figure 4.4 shows the day selections for the 2022 growing season. In this case, the highest-priced days occurred near the end of the growing season. Selecting comparison days following that period would likely have included dates on which pumping was not required for some pumps. The week immediately prior to the high-priced days (September 6 through 8) also had somewhat high prices, so we selected dates during the week of August 22nd (two weeks before the highest prices occurred). For the 2023 and 2024 growing seasons (shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, respectively), we were able to select comparison days from the week prior to the highest-priced days. Note that pumping needs can change significantly from week to week, which limits our ability to attribute usage differences across day types to price effects.

Figure 4.4: AgFIT 1.0 Daily Prices and Selected Comparison Days, August – September 2022



[37] While pumps may operate on any day of the week, limiting our comparisons to the same weekdays helps control for any factors that may change by day of week. For example, a customer primarily scheduling usage during the weekend may affect the typical amount of notice at which the customer transacts by day of week.

Figure 4.5: AgFIT 2.0 Daily Prices and Selected Comparison Days, July – September 2023



Figure 4.6: AgFIT 2.1 Daily Prices and Selected Comparison Days, July – September 2024



In the following figures, we compare average hourly prices and loads across the two day types. Each year is presented as a two-figure panel, with the top panel showing average prices and the bottom panel showing average usage. The dashed lines represent the high-priced days and the solid lines represent the comparison days, with separate figures by year. (The scales are kept constant across years to facilitate comparisons.) Appendix A presents the same information for each customer.

Figure 4.7 shows that prices for the two day types began to diverge in HE 12, with the difference being largest from HE 18 to 20. In contrast, usage differences across day types exist in nearly all hours, suggesting a difference in pumping demand across day types rather than price response (i.e., the usage difference exists even in hours with very similar prices).

Figure 4.7: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, All Enrolled Customers, 2022



Figure 4.8 shows a similar story for 2023, with prices diverging a couple hours later than in 2022, but once again with usage differences occurring in hours with and without price differences across day types.

Figure 4.8: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, All Enrolled Customers, 2023



Figure 4.9 shows that 2024 differs from the earlier years by having prices remain similar across day types through more of the day, with an especially pronounced price difference in hours-ending 19 and 20 ($1.14 and $1.39 higher on the high-price days, respectively). In contrast, the usage profile reflects a downward shift across all hours on the high-price days with little additional response during the highest-priced hours (HE 19 and 20).

Figure 4.9: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, All Enrolled Customers, 2024



<u>Conclusions from the Price Day Type Comparisons</u>

A few conclusions may be drawn from the comparisons of usage across price day types. This includes insights that can be gleaned from the customer-specific figures in Appendix A.

- Because the highest-price hours tend to occur in the same hours as the TOU peak period, customers who are (rationally) still responding to OAT prices by limiting peak-period usage may not have much remaining usage to curtail during high-price days.
- Some customers may not typically have usage (unrelated to OAT response) during the highest-price hours, so further reductions in response to price spikes are not possible.
- Other operational constraints may prevent customers from responding to price spikes.
- Customers may not be aware of the price spike (which was confirmed in customer interviews) if the prices at the time of scheduling did not yet reflect constrained conditions (e.g., they scheduled on Sunday and the price spike happened on Friday, with the 5-day ahead forecast on Sunday not reflecting Friday's price spike).

4.4 Statistical Estimates of Load Impacts

4.4.1 Methodology

The statistical estimation of load impacts incorporates the full set of days in the analysis to model customer usage as a function of the hourly day-ahead dynamic tender prices. In contrast to the day-type comparisons that rely on a small set of days, the regression models are used to discover how customers' pumping behavior responds to Pilot prices over a longer period of time. The results presented below provide mixed evidence of customer response to dynamic prices. Estimates for two customers reflect response to dynamic prices during TOU off-peak hours but not peak hours. This is likely because they manage peak usage on an everyday basis to minimize their billed demand on their OAT rate.

The regression analysis uses the following specification:

$$nkW_{it} = b^{Price} \times Price_{it} + b^{kW\_MA} \times nkW\_MA_{it} + b^{Price\_MA} \times Price\_MA_{it}$$
$$+ b^{Dtype\_Controls} \times Dtype\_Controls_t + \sum_{h=1}^{H} (b_h^{hour} \times Hour_{h,t})$$
$$+ \sum_{p=1}^{P} (b_p^{Pump} \times Pump_{p,i}) + e_{it}$$

The variables and coefficients in the equation are described in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1: Regression Variables

Symbol	Description
nkW_{it}	the demand in hour *t* for a Pilot customer pump *i* divided by the pump's maximum observed hourly usage
The various b's	the estimated parameters
$Price_{it}$	The Pilot program day-ahead price during hour *t* for pump *i*.
nkW_MA_{it}	the three-day moving average of daily usage for pump *i* during hour *t* divided by the pump's maximum observed hourly usage
$Price\_MA_{it}$	the three-day moving average of day-ahead prices for pump *i* during hour *t*
$Dtype\_Controls_t$	set of control variables for day type in hour *t.* The set includes year-month and day of week fixed effects.
$Hour_{h,t}$	an indicator variable for hour *h*, equal to one when *t* corresponds to hour *h* of a given day
$Pump_{p,t}$	an indicator variable for pump *p*, equal to one when *i* corresponds to pump *p* for a given observation
e_{it}	error term for Pilot customer in hour *t*

The dependent variable is normalized by dividing each hour's usage by the pump's maximum observed usage. This helps with the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. We model usage as a function of the day-ahead prices because they are the last prices presented to the customers before the usage hour in question. While the customer may have transacted at earlier dynamic tender prices (e.g., three days ahead) at a fixed quantity, the day-ahead price represents the customer's last transaction opportunity and the best estimate of the ex-post price used in settlement.

The estimated coefficient on price is the key parameter since it indicates the change in kWh associated with a change in price, all else equal. In other words, the price coefficient represents the extent to which the customer responds to the day-ahead dynamic prices. The three-day moving average of quantity is included to control for differences in pumping demand over the growing season.[38] The three-day moving average of the day-ahead tender price is included to control for substitution of pumping demand from previous days. For example, customers may substitute their usage from previous days to the current day if recent prices have been high, all else equal.

We include an interaction of the price variable with a peak-period indicator variable (defined as hours-ending 18 through 20). The estimated coefficient on the standalone price variable represents the customer's price responsiveness during all hours while the coefficient on the peak-interacted price variable (labeled "Price X Peak" in the table below) reflects the incremental price response during peak hours. The interaction variable allows the price responsiveness to vary by TOU pricing period, which could occur if customers respond proportionately more to higher prices (the dynamic prices tend to be highest during TOU peak hours), or response to dynamic prices during peak hours could be muted compared to other hours if customers are managing their OAT billed demand on most or all days.

The model includes additional variables to explain typical usage patterns, independent of the dynamic prices. These include hour-specific indicator variables, day-of-week indicator variables, and year-month indicator variables.

The regression model is estimated separately for each customer using all hours of the day. This allows us to control for unobservable differences between customers while also providing different estimates of price responsiveness. For customers with multiple pumps, we estimate the regression using a panel model containing all the pumps and include pump-specific fixed effects while clustering the standard errors around the pump. The models are separately estimated for the AgFIT 1.0, 2.0, and 2.1 periods.

4.4.2 Results from the Statistical Model

Table 4.2 provides the estimated price coefficients with p-values in parentheses from regression specification described in Section 4.4.1.[39] The estimates are provided for three separate time periods: August and September 2022 (AgFIT 1.0), May through September

[38] Pumping demands generally increase over the summer period. A spurious positive correlation between usage and price occurs if AgFIT prices also increase over the same period. Controlling for changes in pumping demand over time prevents confounding usage changes from increased demands with increased prices.

[39] Table B.1 in the appendix provides additional regression summary statistics, including the number of observations and R^2.

2023 (AgFIT 2.0), and May through September 2024 (AgFIT 2.1).[40] For each pricing period, we show the estimated coefficient on the standalone price variable and the price variable interacted with peak hours. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage reduction in usage relative the pump's peak highest hourly usage in response to a $1 per kWh price change. For example, a value of -0.5 would mean that the customer decreased their usage by 50 percent of their peak hourly usage when prices increased by $1/kWh. Therefore, greater negative coefficient values suggest higher response to prices. Positive values suggest that customer increased usage when prices increased. Such estimates likely indicate omitted variable bias (a factor unknown to the analyst that affects the customer's pumping demand). Bold values indicate a p-value less than 0.05.

It is important to note that the "Price x Peak" coefficients should be interpreted as an *incremental* impact reflecting the difference between the price response during the Peak period and the response across all hours. For example, customer C-005's AgFIT 2.1 estimates are 0.703 in all hours with a Price x Peak estimate of -0.776. Therefore, the total price response during the Peak period for this customer is 0.703 + (-0.776) = -0.073.[41]

The estimates show no statistically significant price response under AgFIT 1.0. Under AgFIT 2.0, two customers (C-004 and C-005) show strong price response outside of the peak period (as represented by the -1.325 and -0.672 coefficients in bold). The offsetting peak-period interaction effect shows that there's no corresponding price response during peak hours. This may be because these customers managed peak-period usage on an everyday basis to manage billed demand on their OAT rate. The managed loads at C-001 have estimates that point toward a similar type of response, though its price coefficient falls short of being statistically significant. Customers C-004 and C-005 did not exhibit statistically significant price response during AgFIT 2.1. In our interviews with them, customer C-005 noted that the incentives to respond seemed lower in 2024 than 2023, which affected the extent of their response.

Two customers have statistically significant price estimate during AgFIT 2.1, though the signs of the estimates point toward a spurious effect. That is, the all-hours price response indicates that the customer uses more when prices increase, with the interaction estimate showing essentially no price response in the peak period (i.e., the "Price" and "Price x Peak" coefficients approximately offset one another).

[40] The AgFIT 1.0 analysis end September 20, 2022, since the average usage is relatively low afterwards due to the end of the growing season.
[41] The advantage of estimating the model in this way is that it provides a direct test of whether the Peak-period price response is statistically significantly different from the all-hours price response.

Table 4.2: Estimates of Customer Price Response

Customer	Managed?	AgFIT 1.0		AgFIT 2.0		AgFIT 2.1	
		Price	Price X Peak	Price	Price X Peak	Price	Price X Peak
C-001	No	N/A	N/A	0.455 (0.144)	-0.541 (0.182)	-0.467 (0.057)	0.340 (0.111)
	Yes	0.011 (0.860)	-0.033 (0.641)	-0.378 (0.080)	**0.438 (0.026)**	-0.122 (0.427)	0.189 (0.246)
C-002	Yes	-0.069 (0.507)	-0.069 (0.531)	0.175 (0.257)	-0.168 (0.262)	0.092 (0.376)	-0.153 (0.214)
C-003	Yes	N/A	N/A	0.024 (0.850)	-0.210 (0.122)	0.009 (0.930)	-0.060 (0.660)
C-004	Yes	N/A	N/A	**-1.325 (0.000)**	**1.253 (0.000)**	0.006 (0.959)	-0.045 (0.684)
C-005	Leased to a Customer	N/A	N/A	-0.007 (0.876)	-0.024 (0.579)	**0.703 (0.008)**	**-0.776 (0.004)**
	Yes	N/A	N/A	**-0.672 (0.000)**	**0.571 (0.000)**	-0.130 (0.168)	0.075 (0.426)
C-006	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.140 (0.550)	0.117 (0.611)
C-007	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	**0.238 (0.027)**	**-0.318 (0.005)**

p-values in parentheses.

This section provides evidence that is consistent with some customers simultaneously responding to OAT and AgFIT incentives. Specifically, customers C-004 and C-005 adjusted off-peak usage levels in response to dynamic prices (at least in 2023) but appeared to manage peak-period usage every day in response to the OAT demand charge. There may be other behaviors motivated by OAT pricing that we can't discern as easily from these estimates. Ultimately, the Pilot was not designed to provide rigorous estimates of customer response to dynamic prices, which is attributable to the shadow bill credit methodology.

In addition, it is worth noting that our analysis looks at customer response vis-à-vis the day-ahead prices (used in settlement under AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1) rather than the prices the customer saw at the time they scheduled usage, which could have been up to seven days ahead. This method is employed for both practical and theoretical reasons. On a practical level, we don't know when customers made their usage decisions for a specific hour or when they looked at prices. We can observe from transactions the hours in which customers decided to pump (at least provisionally – sometimes they sell it back), but there's no record in AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 of a customer's decision to avoid high-priced hours (i.e., there's no subscription they can sell back). This makes it difficult to assign a price other than the ex-post price to each hour.[42]

The theoretical case for using ex-post prices in the price response analysis can be illustrated via an example: if a customer transacted five days ahead at a low price but then the ex-post price was significantly higher, a decision to follow through on the pumping would save the customer money relative to pumping at ex-post prices, but it wouldn't cause system or circuit loads to decline in response to constrained conditions (as

[42] We also show in Section 6.3 that most customers purchased the majority of their usage at the ex-post price, which further supports our methods.

reflected in the high ex-post prices). Ultimately the response that's most relevant from a societal perspective is the relationship between usage and ex-post prices.[43] In Section 6, we present information showing that customers benefited from transactions (i.e., saving money relative to what they would have paid if all usage was purchased at settlement prices), which reflects awareness of and response to prices earlier than the day-ahead prices examined in this section.

5 CUSTOMER BILL IMPACTS AND CREDITS

As described in the introduction, Pilot participants continue to pay their OAT bill through the duration of the Pilot. Each month, a shadow bill is calculated representing what they would have paid under the AgFIT pricing model. At the end of a period of time, the customer is credited if their cumulative AgFIT charges are less than their cumulative OAT bill, but the customer does not pay more if the OAT bills are lower than the AgFIT charges (i.e., they have bill protection at the service account level). In this section we summarize AgFIT and OAT bills for three periods of time: AgFIT 1.0 from August 2022 through April 2023, AgFIT 2.0 from May through September 2023, and AgFIT 2.0/2.1 bills from October 2023 through September 2024.[44]

Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 provide summaries of the customer-level bill impacts by time period.[45,46] Each column represents a customer. The table shows both the simple difference between the OAT bill and the AgFIT charges (row 5) as well as the shadow billing credit (row 6), which omits pumps for which the total OAT bill is lower than the total AgFIT charges.

Across all columns and tables, the customers were eligible to receive a shadow billing credit. The total Pilot credit across all customers and years was 8.3% of the corresponding OAT bill total. Every customer earned a credit in each growing season, however not every pump received a credit in each growing season. In total, pumps were on track to receive a credit 64% of the time (counting each growing season for a pump separately). In addition, one customer (C-001) had aggregate OAT bills that were lower than their aggregate AgFIT charges in each time period. While every customer with more than two pumps benefited from the "bill protection" embedded in the shadow bill credit method, only customer C-001 had an aggregate Pilot bill that exceeded its aggregate OAT bill.

[43] When deployed at scale, the scheduling facilitated by the Pilot would provide the market with information that would lead to market feedback loops. For example, if enough customers schedule pumping in low-priced hours offered for three days hence, subsequent pricing for that day will tend to be higher (all else equal) due to the increased demand.

[44] At the time of this writing, credits have been delivered to customers for the May to September 2023 period but not for the other periods.

[45] Table 5.3 excludes NEM accounts, which had a billing issue that was being resolved at the time of this writing.

[46] Note that the AgFIT credits in Table 5.2 represent the amounts paid to customers. It was later discovered that monthly customer charges were inadvertently excluded from the AgFIT charges. Tables 5.10 through 5.14 show the AgFIT credits adjusted for the inclusion of the customer charges.

Table 5.1: Summary of Bill Impacts, AgFIT 1.0

Row #	Result Type	C-001	C-002	C-003
1	# Pumps	9	8	5
2	MWh	156.3	250.0	43.0
3	OAT Bill	$52,311	$82,272	$30,321
4	AgFIT Bill	$54,838	$64,229	$28,390
5	OAT – AgFIT Bill	-$2,527	$18,043	$1,932
6	Pilot Billing Credit	$5,640	$20,315	$3,813
7	OAT $/kWh (Row 3/Row 2)	$0.335	$0.329	$0.705
8	AgFIT $/kWh (Row 4/Row 2)	$0.351	$0.257	$0.660
9	% Bill Difference (Row 5/Row 3)	-4.8%	21.9%	6.4%
10	Credit as % of OAT Bill (Row 6/Row 3)	10.8%	24.7%	12.6%

Table 5.2: Summary of Bill Impacts, AgFIT 2.0

Row #	Result Type	C-001	C-002	C-003	C-004	C-005
1	# Pumps	15	8	7	1	2
2	MWh	1,588.7	522.0	430.2	50.8	35.0
3	OAT Bill	$520,385	$174,129	$138,136	$19,440	$13,244
4	AgFIT Bill	$534,572	$169,085	$133,670	$13,865	$9,529
5	OAT – AgFIT Bill	-$14,187	$5,044	$4,466	$5,575	$3,715
6	Pilot Billing Credit	$25,163	$9,738	$12,926	$5,575	$3,715
7	OAT $/kWh (Row 3/Row 2)	$0.328	$0.334	$0.321	$0.383	$0.379
8	AgFIT $/kWh (Row 4/Row 2)	$0.336	$0.324	$0.311	$0.273	$0.273
9	% Bill Difference (Row 5/Row 3)	-2.7%	2.9%	3.2%	28.7%	28.0%
10	Credit as % of OAT Bill (Row 6/Row 3)	4.8%	5.6%	9.4%	28.7%	28.0%

Table 5.3: Summary of Bill Impacts, AgFIT 2.0/2.1

Row #	Result Type	C-001	C-002	C-003	C-004	C-005	C-006	C-007
1	# Pumps	10	6	16	9	2	2	1
2	MWh	741.7	518.8	1,122.0	312.3	122.4	63.4	2.4
3	OAT Bill	$271,655	$198,395	$401,931	$145,090	$54,128	$22,842	$1,016
4	AgFIT Bill	$271,758	$191,365	$360,314	$134,753	$52,088	$21,104	$275
5	OAT – AgFIT Bill	-$103	$7,030	$41,617	$10,337	$2,040	$1,738	$741
6	Pilot Billing Credit	$15,688	$10,082	$46,739	$13,312	$2,040	$1,738	$741
7	OAT $/kWh (Row 3/Row 2)	$0.366	$0.382	$0.358	$0.465	$0.442	$0.360	$0.422
8	AgFIT $/kWh (Row 4/Row 2)	$0.366	$0.369	$0.321	$0.432	$0.426	$0.333	$0.114
9	% Bill Difference (Row 5/Row 3)	0.0%	3.5%	10.4%	7.1%	3.8%	7.6%	72.9%
10	Credit as % of OAT Bill (Row 6/Row 3)	5.8%	5.1%	11.6%	9.2%	3.8%	7.6%	72.9%

The sub-sections below provide detail at the pump level by customer.

5.1.1 Bill Impacts from August 2022 through April 2023

Table 5.4 summarizes the OAT bill and AgFIT charges during the AgFIT 1.0 period for customer C-001. This period included the later portion of the 2022 growing season into the following spring. The table includes pump-specific amounts for AgFIT 1.0 billing periods that were provided to us by TeMix. The tables contain the total kWh consumed by the customer, the total OAT bill and AgFIT dollar amounts, the difference between the OAT bill and AgFIT charges, and the shadow bill credit (which is the greater of zero and the difference between the OAT bill and AgFIT charges). Four of the nine pumps had AgFIT charges that were lower than the corresponding OAT bill. The total shadow bill credit was $5,640.[47]

[47] For pump 5 the AgFIT charges were negative. This indicates that customer C-001 managed to "sell back" a significant amount of energy during high-priced periods. The relatively high average OAT price of $0.53/kWh indicates that the pump's usage profile had a low load factor and/or a high share of energy consumed in the Peak pricing period.

Table 5.4: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 1.0, C-001

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	729	$719	$1,433	-$714	$0
2	30,831	$9,001	$12,267	-$3,265	$0
3	28,250	$9,482	$8,663	$818	$818
4	23,531	$6,278	$4,910	$1,369	$1,369
5	3,212	$1,692	-$45	$1,737	$1,737
6	29,187	$10,973	$11,209	-$237	$0
7	7,235	$2,995	$4,629	-$1,635	$0
8	22,389	$7,343	$9,658	-$2,316	$0
9	10,943	$3,829	$2,113	$1,716	$1,716
Total	**156,308**	**$52,311**	**$54,838**	**-$2,527**	**$5,640**

Table 5.5 shows how the total usage was divided between subscription purchases, net dynamic price (ex-ante) transactions (purchases and sales in response to tenders prior to the day of pumping), and the net ex-post transactions over the billing period. The dynamic and ex-post quantities represent the net amount after combining the purchases (i.e., buying more than their subscription quantity) and sales (selling unused subscription). For example, pump 3 had a subscription quantity of 60,684 kWh and transacted to sell a net amount of 345 kWh ahead of time, with an additional net 31,789 kWh sold at ex-post prices, reflecting significantly lower usage in the Pilot period versus the historical period used as the basis for the subscription (i.e., the corresponding months in the prior year).

Table 5.5 also adds the average price paid for these categories, thereby allowing comparisons to the average price for the OAT bill. The subscription price was higher than the average OAT price for two of the nine pumps. Differences between the subscription and OAT average prices do not necessarily indicate mispricing of the subscription. That is, the subscription price represents the customer's historical load profile, and if that load profile changes while on the Pilot, the average OAT price paid may change as well. For example, a demand-billed customer who decreased its load factor across years (leading to relatively higher demand charges) would likely experience an average OAT price per kWh that is higher than the subscription price.[48]

[48] Note that the average transaction prices for dynamic and ex-post prices are calculated as the total net charges across all purchases and sales divided by the net kWh bought or sold. Therefore, they do not necessarily reflect the average dynamic or ex-post price at the time when the energy was being bought or sold.

Table 5.5: Comparison of Subscription, Dynamic, and Ex-Post Average Net Transaction Prices Paid, AgFIT 1.0, C-001

Pump	kWh	Subscription kWh	Dynamic kWh	Ex Post kWh	OAT $/kWh	Subscription $/kWh	Dynamic $/kWh	Ex Post $/kWh
1	729	10,137	0	-9,407	$0.97	$0.32	N/A	$0.21
2	30,831	73,214	-19,332	-23,051	$0.29	$0.31	$0.34	$0.18
3	28,250	60,384	-345	-31,789	$0.34	$0.26	$3.29	$0.19
4	23,531	54,490	-16,214	-14,745	$0.27	$0.24	$0.36	$0.15
5	3,212	72,879	0	-69,668	$0.53	$0.25	N/A	$0.26
6	29,187	51,522	-2,108	-20,227	$0.38	$0.29	$0.30	$0.16
7	7,235	17,901	4,475	-15,141	$0.41	$0.27	$0.77	$0.26
8	22,389	12,371	0	10,018	$0.33	$0.42	N/A	$0.40
9	10,943	67,922	-2,804	-54,176	$0.35	$0.20	$0.28	$0.21

It might be instructive to interpret the results for customer C-001's pump 2. Table 5.4 shows that the customer paid $3,265 more on AgFIT versus its OAT bill. The information in Table 5.5 provides important context for that bill comparison. Notice that the subscription average price of $0.31 per kWh is above the current OAT average price of $0.29 per kWh. Because the subscription price reflects the customer's pre-Pilot OAT bill (with an escalator applied to account for current rate levels), this comparison indicates that the customer likely saved money on this pump relative to its pre-Pilot bills. The customer was able to benefit by selling much of the subscription it purchased at $0.31 per kWh for an average of $0.34 per kWh at dynamic prices. However, the customer also sold a substantial portion of its subscription load (23,051 kWh) at ex-post settlement prices, which were low relative to the subscription price. That is, on average the customer paid $0.31 per kWh for 23,051 kWh it later sold for an average of $0.18 per kWh.

Table 5.6 summarizes the OAT bill and AgFIT charges during the AgFIT 1.0 period for customer C-002. Five of the eight pumps had AgFIT charges that were lower than the corresponding OAT bill. The total shadow bill credit was $20,315.

Table 5.6: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 1.0, C-002

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	47,075	$15,320	$6,972	$8,348	$8,348
2	20,099	$8,708	$9,009	-$301	$0
3	39,304	$12,151	$10,334	$1,818	$1,818
4	18,262	$6,444	$6,493	-$49	$0
5	34,301	$12,012	$7,689	$4,324	$4,324
6	35,844	$12,056	$9,227	$2,829	$2,829
7	26,658	$6,822	$8,745	-$1,922	$0
8	28,502	$8,758	$5,761	$2,997	$2,997
Total	**250,045**	**$82,272**	**$64,229**	**$18,043**	**$20,315**

Table 5.7 shows how the total usage was divided between subscription purchases, dynamic price transactions, and the net ex-post kWh over the billing period for customer C-002. The subscription price was higher than the average OAT price for two of the eight pumps.

Table 5.7: Comparison of Subscription, Dynamic, and Ex Post Price Paid, AgFIT 1.0, C-002

Pump	kWh	Subscription kWh	Dynamic kWh	Ex Post kWh	OAT $/kWh	Subscription $/kWh	Dynamic $/kWh	Ex Post $/kWh
1	47,075	84,474	-8,996	-28,404	$0.33	$0.23	$0.41	$0.30
2	20,099	15,319	0	4,780	$0.43	$0.48	N/A	$0.33
3	39,304	65,202	-149	-25,748	$0.31	$0.26	$11.51	$0.21
4	18,262	33,472	-2,664	-12,546	$0.35	$0.29	$0.40	$0.20
5	34,301	49,169	-4,750	-10,117	$0.35	$0.24	$0.55	$0.17
6	35,844	0	207	35,637	$0.34	N/A	$0.20	$0.25
7	26,658	22,263	-1,030	5,427	$0.26	$0.34	$0.60	$0.31
8	28,502	100,758	2,916	-75,171	$0.31	$0.21	$0.31	$0.23

Table 5.8 summarizes the OAT bill and AgFIT charges during the AgFIT 1.0 period for customer C-003. Three of the five pumps had AgFIT charges that were lower than the corresponding OAT bill. The total shadow bill credit was $3,813. Note that this customer did not become active in the Pilot until November 2022, after the 2022 growing season concluded.

Table 5.8: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 1.0, C-003

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	9,947	$7,167	$7,254	-$86	$0
2	12,599	$10,763	$9,971	$792	$792
3	3,753	$1,766	-$853	$2,619	$2,619
4	4,802	$3,395	$2,993	$402	$402
5	11,913	$7,230	$9,025	-$1,795	$0
Total	**43,014**	**$30,321**	**$28,390**	**$1,932**	**$3,813**

Table 5.9 shows how the total usage was divided between subscription purchases, dynamic price transactions, and the net ex-post kWh over the billing period for customer C-003. The subscription price was never higher than the average OAT price for this customer's pumps. The customer consistently had more subscription usage than it needed during this time period.

Table 5.9: Comparison of Subscription, Dynamic, and Ex Post Price Paid, AgFIT 1.0, C-003

Pump	kWh	Subscription kWh	Dynamic kWh	Ex Post kWh	OAT $/kWh	Subscription $/kWh	Dynamic $/kWh	Ex Post $/kWh
1	9,947	58,157	-15,067	-33,143	$0.72	$0.27	$0.16	$0.18
2	12,599	39,084	-6,947	-19,538	$0.85	$0.37	$0.20	$0.18
3	3,753	82,573	-1,871	-76,948	$0.47	$0.19	$0.22	$0.21
4	4,802	10,758	-1,117	-4,839	$0.71	$0.38	$0.18	$0.23
5	11,913	47,232	-6,003	-29,316	$0.61	$0.32	$0.20	$0.17

5.1.2 Bill Impacts from May through September 2023

Tables 5.10 through 5.14 summarize the OAT bills and AgFIT charges from May through September 2023, during which the AgFIT 2.0 pricing method was in place. The tables contain the total kWh consumed by the customer, the total OAT bill and AgFIT dollar amounts, the difference between the OAT bill and AgFIT charges, and the shadow bill credit (which is the greater of zero and the difference between the OAT bill and the AgFIT charges).

During this period, the AgFIT charges inadvertently excluded monthly customer charges, and those bills served as the basis for the credits paid to customers. The rightmost column of the table shows what the credit would have been had the customer charges been included in the AgFIT charges. In aggregate across the customers and pumps, the inclusion of the customer charges reduces the credit by 5.9%.

Table 5.10 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-001's pumps under the specified AgFIT 2.0 period. The AgFIT charges were lower than the corresponding OAT bill for eight of the fifteen pumps. Eight of the nine pumps that were also on the Pilot during AgFIT 1.0 received a shadow bill credit during AgFIT 2.0 this time period. In contrast, none of the six pumps that only participated during AgFIT 2.0 earned a credit.

Table 5.10: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.0, C-001

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Original Pilot Credit	Pilot Credit w/ Cust. Charge
1	15,373	$5,440	$4,510	$929	$929	$825
2	91,250	$31,403	$24,709	$6,694	$6,694	$6,478
3	103,705	$35,630	$32,118	$3,513	$3,513	$3,297
4	43,400	$12,940	$13,079	-$139	$0	$0
5	107,898	$33,625	$31,599	$2,026	$2,026	$1,810
6	5,360	$2,872	$1,528	$1,345	$1,345	$1,207
7	33,387	$11,082	$9,492	$1,590	$1,590	$1,374
8	61,940	$19,111	$17,534	$1,577	$1,577	$1,361
9	57,534	$22,564	$15,076	$7,489	$7,489	$7,273
10	101,950	$32,090	$34,044	-$1,954	$0	$0
11	111,114	$36,226	$37,485	-$1,260	$0	$0
12	275,280	$97,326	$110,569	-$13,243	$0	$0
13	301,210	$86,368	$100,173	-$13,804	$0	$0
14	151,671	$53,892	$59,580	-$5,688	$0	$0
15	127,587	$39,817	$43,079	-$3,262	$0	$0
Total	**1,588,660**	**$520,385**	**$534,572**	**-$14,187**	**$25,163**	**$23,625**

Table 5.11 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-002's pumps under the specified AgFIT 2.0 period. The AgFIT charges were lower than the corresponding OAT bill for five of the eight pumps, though one of those pumps (pump 8) would not have been paid a credit had customer charges been included in the AgFIT charges. The aggregate shadow bill credit was $9,738, which would have been reduced to $9,224 had customer charges been included in the AgFIT charges.

Table 5.11: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.0, C-002

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Original Pilot Credit	Pilot Credit w/ Cust. Charge
1	99,096	$30,015	$25,233	$4,782	$4,782	$4,782
2	33,165	$13,908	$10,976	$2,932	$2,932	$2,932
3	91,988	$29,878	$28,227	$1,651	$1,651	$1,435
4	34,753	$11,040	$11,616	-$576	$0	$0
5	79,723	$23,859	$24,536	-$677	$0	$0
6	106,454	$39,406	$42,847	-$3,441	$0	$0
7	872	$502	$213	$290	$290	$75
8	75,935	$25,520	$25,437	$84	$84	$0
Total	**521,985**	**$174,129**	**$169,085**	**$5,044**	**$9,738**	**$9,224**

Table 5.12 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-003's pumps under the specified AgFIT 2.0 period. The AgFIT charges were lower than the corresponding OAT bill for four of the seven pumps. Overall, the AgFIT charges for customer C-003 were only marginally lower than the OAT bills ($133,670 vs. $138,136), but because the "best-of" customer billing method used in the Pilot doesn't bill for AgFIT charges when the total is higher than the OAT bill for each individual pump, C-003 will end up having paid only $125,210 (the $138,136 OAT bill minus the $12,926 shadow billing credit).

Table 5.12: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.0, C-003

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Original Pilot Credit	Pilot Credit w/ Cust. Charge
1	154,466	$43,015	$47,110	-$4,095	$0	$0
2	20,682	$10,048	$5,912	$4,136	$4,136	$3,917
3	122,225	$41,841	$36,970	$4,871	$4,871	$4,652
4	4,942	$1,987	$1,273	$715	$715	$496
5	25,958	$11,814	$8,608	$3,206	$3,206	$2,987
6	55,666	$16,711	$17,515	-$804	$0	$0
7	46,306	$12,719	$16,281	-$3,562	$0	$0
Total	**430,245**	**$138,136**	**$133,670**	**$4,466**	**$12,926**	**$12,050**

Table 5.13 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for customer C-004's pump under the specified AgFIT 2.0 period. The AgFIT charges were $5,575 lower than the corresponding OAT bill for the single pump.

Table 5.13: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.0, C-004

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Original Pilot Credit	Pilot Credit w/ Cust. Charge
1	50,755	$19,440	$13,865	$5,575	$5,575	$5,445

Table 5.14 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-005's pumps under the specified AgFIT 2.0 period. The AgFIT charges were lower than the corresponding OAT bill for both pumps, with a combined shadow bill credit of $3,715.

Table 5.14: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.0, C-005

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Original Pilot Credit	Pilot Credit w/ Cust. Charge
1	4,722	$3,331	$1,854	$1,477	$1,477	$1,337
2	30,242	$9,913	$7,675	$2,238	$2,238	$2,066
Total	**34,963**	**$13,244**	**$9,529**	**$3,715**	**$3,715**	**$3,403**

Under AgFIT 2.0, some of the pumps show large differences between the average price paid under the OAT bill and AgFIT charges. For example, customer C-003's pump 2 shown in Table 5.12 has an OAT average price of $0.49 per kWh while its AgFIT charges average $0.29 per kWh. Recall that AgFIT 2.0's pricing method scales the dynamic tenders to an OAT price level and there is no separate subscription (as in AgFIT 1.0). However, the OAT bills shown in these tables reflect the customer's usage billed at its OAT rates while the class-average OAT price paid is used to scale dynamic tenders. Large differences between the OAT bill and AgFIT charges may reflect differences between the customer's load profile and the class average profile.

5.1.3 Bill Impacts from October 2023 through September 2024

Tables 5.15 through 5.21 summarize bills from October 2023 through September 2024 by customer. While this time period combines months priced under AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1, the bulk of the usage is from the 2023 growing season (May through September 2024), which was billed at AgFIT 2.1 prices.

Table 5.15 provides the comparison of OAT bill and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-001's pumps from October 2023 through September 2024. The customer is on track to receive a 5.8% credit ($15,688), while the aggregate difference between the AgFIT charges and OAT bills was slightly negative (-$103). This difference is caused by four of the pumps failing to receive a credit.

Table 5.15: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-001

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	4,373	$3,785	$1,843	$1,942	$1,942
3	90,721	$38,390	$32,010	$6,379	$6,379
4	69,124	$22,198	$25,534	-$3,336	$0
6	57,397	$27,554	$25,739	$1,815	$1,815
7	48,798	$16,921	$17,538	-$617	$0
9	216,981	$64,644	$76,099	-$11,454	$0
11	125,180	$47,375	$44,269	$3,106	$3,106
18	14,967	$7,340	$5,129	$2,211	$2,211
20	82,777	$29,309	$29,693	-$384	$0
21	31,375	$14,139	$13,903	$236	$236
Total	**741,693**	**$271,655**	**$271,758**	**-$103**	**$15,688**

Table 5.16 provides the comparison of OAT bills and AgFIT charges for each of customer C-002's pumps. Half of the pumps did not receive a credit, thus leading the customer to benefit from the shadow billing credit methodology. The aggregate credit is 5.1% of the OAT bill, while the corresponding difference between the total OAT bill and AgFIT charges is 3.5%.

Table 5.16: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-002

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
3	105,024	$41,624	$36,314	$5,309	$5,309
4	49,690	$18,588	$18,981	-$393	$0
6	145,755	$58,283	$58,614	-$331	$0
7	62,122	$24,270	$21,792	$2,478	$2,478
8	107,263	$39,349	$37,054	$2,295	$2,295
9	48,978	$16,282	$18,610	-$2,328	$0
Total	**518,832**	**$198,395**	**$191,365**	**$7,030**	**$10,082**

Two of the sixteen pumps for C-003 (shown in Table 5.17) did not receive a credit. The gap between the credit and the total bill difference is therefore smaller than it was for the two preceding customers, with a 11.6% credit and a 10.4% total bill difference.

Table 5.17: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-003

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	232,022	$81,025	$78,200	$2,826	$2,826
2	121,799	$54,293	$38,138	$16,155	$16,155
3	143,616	$54,190	$50,190	$4,000	$4,000
4	10,789	$4,383	$3,514	$868	$868
5	107,111	$41,968	$33,077	$8,891	$8,891
6	192,073	$65,665	$65,433	$231	$231
7	86,829	$30,450	$32,335	-$1,885	$0
8	82,451	$18,467	$21,704	-$3,237	$0
9	21,175	$5,258	$4,158	$1,100	$1,100
10	2,222	$386	$135	$252	$252
11	17,200	$4,020	$2,515	$1,504	$1,504
12	33,663	$14,690	$10,614	$4,077	$4,077
13	9,318	$3,247	$2,309	$938	$938
14	44,231	$16,269	$12,567	$3,703	$3,703
15	1,594	$990	$432	$558	$558
16	15,928	$6,629	$4,994	$1,636	$1,636
Total	**1,122,020**	**$401,931**	**$360,314**	**$41,617**	**$46,739**

Six of the nine pumps for customer C-004 received a credit, as shown in Table 5.18. The aggregate credit was 9.2% of the OAT bill, while the total bill difference (total OAT – total AgFIT charges) was 7.1%.

Table 5.18: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-004

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	51,415	$27,256	$18,724	$8,533	$8,533
2	20,727	$10,104	$9,728	$376	$376
3	41,399	$17,029	$14,436	$2,593	$2,593
4	3,358	$1,932	$1,218	$714	$714
5	25,822	$12,828	$11,938	$890	$890
6	67,308	$29,716	$31,275	-$1,559	$0
7	1,156	$835	$629	$206	$206
8	40,862	$18,342	$18,729	-$387	$0
9	60,237	$27,047	$28,077	-$1,030	$0
Total	**312,283**	**$145,090**	**$134,753**	**$10,337**	**$13,312**

Table 5.19 shows that both of customer C-005's pumps received a credit. Recall that customer C-005 only managed pump 2, with the other pump leased to another customer.

Table 5.19: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-005

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	75,865	$36,172	$35,708	$464	$464
2	46,489	$17,956	$16,380	$1,576	$1,576
Total	**122,354**	**$54,128**	**$52,088**	**$2,040**	**$2,040**

Table 5.20 shows that both of customer C-006's pumps received a credit, totaling 7.6% of the combined OAT bills.

Table 5.20: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-006

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	28,082	$10,573	$9,232	$1,340	$1,340
2	35,320	$12,269	$11,871	$398	$398
Total	**63,403**	**$22,842**	**$21,104**	**$1,738**	**$1,738**

Table 5.21 shows that customer C-007's sole pump received a credit of 72.9%. In the following section, we will describe a pricing error that allowed the customer to receive such a high credit.

Table 5.21: OAT vs AgFIT Bills, AgFIT 2.1, C-007

Pump	kWh	OAT Bill	AgFIT Bill	OAT – AgFIT Bill	Pilot Credit
1	2,409	$1,016	$275	$741	$741
Total	**2,409**	**$1,016**	**$275**	**$741**	**$741**

6 COST RECOVERY

The Decision requires an evaluation of the recovery of generation, resource adequacy (RA), and delivery costs by the Pilot rates. Stakeholder comments during the proceeding reflect concern that the Pilot could shift costs to other service classes. There is particular concern about the scarcity pricing concept used to allocate generation capacity, flexible capacity, and distribution capacity costs to hourly prices.[49]

We approach this issue in three ways. First, we discuss a CAISO settlement issue that creates a mismatch between changes in customer bills and changes in VCE's wholesale costs. Second, we provide an overview of cost recovery under the AgFIT 1.0 pricing method. Third, we explore potential sources of AgFIT credits, which can include response to dynamic prices, structural benefits, and dynamic price arbitrage.

6.1 AgFIT and CAISO Settlement

One theory of dynamic pricing pilots is that the providers and customers can both win if load impacts produce changes in customer bills that are closely related to changes in avoided costs. For example, customers reducing usage during an hour with high CAISO LMPs will pay less on their bill and reduce generation costs for its load serving entity (LSE). However, AgFIT embeds a disconnect between the changes in bills and changes in energy costs because VCE uses the PG&E load profile for CAISO settlement. An example will illustrate the issue. An AgFIT customer that reduces its usage by 100 kWh when the CAISO LMP is $1,000/MWh ($1 per kWh) will reduce its bill by the amount of the LMP plus the other factors included in the AgFIT dynamic price. However, VCE's wholesale power costs will not be reduced by $1/kWh times 100 kWh because the 100 kWh reduction will be "spread" across all hours of the PG&E settlement profile (in proportion to

[49] E.g., Public Advocate's Office Opening Comments to the Proposed Phase 2 Decision at page 9, November 10, 2021.

the usage by hour in that profile). The reduction in VCE's CAISO energy costs will therefore be 100 kWh times the day's load weighted average LMP (where the load weights come from PG&E's settlement profile). As a result, in this example VCE will pay the customer more for its load reduction than it receives in energy cost savings from CAISO.[50]

Our understanding is that the use of PG&E's settlement profile is a common practice among Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) such as VCE because PG&E's profile is less variable due to the large number of customers included in it. That is, using PG&E's settlement profile is perceived to be less risky for the CCAs. However, if dynamic pricing programs are going to scale to a significant share of a CCA's load, it seems that the settlement disconnect will need to be addressed.[51] Note that this settlement "mismatch" concern is not applicable to the capacity component of the dynamic prices.

6.2 AgFIT 1.0 Pricing and Cost Recovery

Aside from the settlement issue, the AgFIT 1.0 method is expected to produce prices that recover generation and delivery costs if the customer's actual load closely matches its subscription quantity.[52] This would be because the subscription component of the methodology sets the prices based on the customer's historical usage level and profile at OAT rates. However, when there are deviations from the customer's historic usage the difference is priced using marginal energy costs (i.e., CAISO LMPs) plus allocated capacity and other fixed costs. When a customer changes their load under AgFIT 1.0, savings are determined by marginal costs (which are also reduced for the Load Serving Entity, apart from the settlement profile issue discussed above). But the customer also saves on non-marginal costs, whereas the LSE doesn't see reduced non-marginal costs. Therefore, under AgFIT 1.0, customers that shift or reduce load significantly could shift some non-marginal costs to other customers. This may be mitigated when the pricing methods are recalibrated (perhaps annually) to recover sufficient revenues to cover costs.

The AgFIT 1.0 method of applying an escalation factor also had a potential problem in misallocating revenue between PG&E vs. VCE. That is, the escalation factor method described in Section 2 (that translated 2022 OAT bills into 2023 price levels) implicitly assumed that the PG&E and VCE components of the bill would escalate at the same rate and that customers did not change their OAT rate from 2022 to 2023. However, some customers may require different escalation factors than others. For example, because the all-hours demand charge (versus the peak-period demand charge) is part of the distribution bill but not the generation bill, a customer with high all-hours demand

[50] Note that the ability of the Pilot to show prices in all 24 hours aligns with the CPUC's Slice of Day (SOD) RA structure that is scheduled to be implemented in 2025. The ability of VCE to incent customers to shift out of future high-priced overnight hours and reduce its RA buy during those hours could address the current energy-only savings calculations described above.

[51] The TeMix transactive platform used for this pilot can sum the forward transactions across all of a CCA's participants in CalFUSE so that as participation scales to a significant share of a CCA's load, the CCA can self-schedule and settle with the CAISO.

[52] For the three customers enrolled during AgFIT 1.0, there tended to be significant differences between the subscription kWh and the Pilot-year observed kWh at the pump level (as shown in the billing summary tables). Some of this difference could be due to crop rotation, which may cause usage to shift across pumps from year to year.

relative to its other bill components could have a different PG&E bill impact than VCE bill impact as tariff rates change. This issue was not addressed by PG&E and VCE before August 1, 2022, but could be corrected in future applications of the pricing method by pricing each customer's historical loads at current OAT rates when creating subscription prices.

6.3 Potential Sources of Shadow Bill Credits

As shown in Section 5, all participating customers and most pumps received a shadow bill credit. From a cost recovery perspective, the important consideration is whether the bill savings are at least matched by cost savings. To assess this, it is useful to understand the source of the shadow bill credit. There are at least three potential causes:

- Price response: shifting usage from high- to low-priced hours can lead to bill savings that are offset by reduced cost to serve.
- Transaction benefits: because AgFIT allows customers to transact up to seven days ahead, and multiple times for a specific delivery time, customers may benefit by buying power at dynamic prices that are lower than the price for which they sell the power (if they don't end up pumping) or than they would have paid if they didn't schedule pumping and paid settlement prices.[53]
- Structural benefits: a customer may have usage characteristics such that the customer can save money without changing their behavior compared to what they would have done in the absence of the Pilot.
- Changes in customer usage profiles producing larger changes in OAT bills than AgFIT bills. For example, a large increase in billed demand will likely produce a larger increase in the OAT bill than the AgFIT bill, thus contributing to a Pilot credit.

We evaluated the extent of price responsiveness in Section 4, and the results showed that there was not sufficient price response to warrant the credits customers had received. We therefore focus on exploring the other potential causes in this section.

6.3.1 Transaction Benefits

Customers can benefit from transacting prior to the delivery date in two ways: buying energy at a lower price than they would have had to pay at settlement; and buying energy at a relatively low price and then selling it back at a higher price.

In this section, we examine customer transactions data to obtain a picture of how customers interacted with Pilot prices and the gains they obtained from doing so. Table

[53] The Pilot design intent was that it wouldn't be possible to consistently benefit from transactions simply due to days-ahead prices being systematically lower than settlement prices. Rather, the intent was that transactions would provide a means for customers to have certainty over pricing (by locking them in at the time of scheduling) while maintaining the customer's incentive to reduce usage if prices rise as the delivery date approaches because of changes in system conditions.

6.1 shows the percentage of dynamic transactions (i.e., scheduled pumping) by day of week for each customer. Each customer's most frequent day of week is highlighted in green and any day of week with 5% or less of the transactions is highlighted in red. These thresholds help us understand whether customers appear to be checking prices regularly or perhaps only once a week.[54] Sunday and Monday are the days with the highest shares of transactions, while Friday is the day with the lowest share. Note that the scheduling behavior has implications for the notice at which certain days are transacted. For example, customer C-002 typically schedules on a Monday, so usage scheduled for Friday will be four days ahead of delivery. This may affect customer response to price spikes that occur later in the week, if the spike was not foreseeable more than a day ahead of delivery. That is, the customer may not be aware of a price spike if it does not show up on a day they are scheduling.

Table 6.1: Share of Dynamic Transactions Scheduled by Day of Week

Customer	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
C-001	41%	19%	8%	1%	3%	6%	22%
C-002	0%	76%	20%	5%	0%	0%	0%
C-003	2%	30%	17%	15%	6%	6%	25%
C-004	46%	14%	2%	5%	12%	9%	11%
C-005	8%	33%	17%	16%	5%	10%	11%
C-006	0%	29%	20%	14%	10%	2%	24%
C-007	59%	18%	4%	0%	10%	3%	6%

Table 6.2 separates usage and average prices by hours in which a dynamic transaction was conducted (i.e., the customer scheduled pumping) versus hours that were entirely priced at the settlement (ex-post) prices. Comparing the kWh values in column 5 (usage entirely purchased at settlement) and column 3 (all usage) shows the extent to which customers scheduled their pumping, expressed as a percentage shown in column 6. For example, customers C-001 and C-002 scheduled a lower percentage of their usage than customers C-006 and C-007. In addition, every customer purchased a higher share of their usage at settlement in AgFIT 2.1 than AgFIT 2.0, with the largest percentage changes occurring for customers C-004 and C-005.

The average price columns (7 and 8) show that customers paid a lower average price per kWh when they scheduled usage (i.e., hours with a dynamic transaction) than when they did not. (The especially low dynamic transaction $/kWh value for customer C-007 is explained below.) This suggests that customers are scheduling in ways that save them money, finding hours and/or days-ahead transactions that save them money. This conclusion is only limited by the fact that two thirds of all usage shown in the table was purchased at settlement, with no scheduled pumping (dynamic transactions). That is,

[54] We only have data reflecting transactions, so we don't have direct information regarding the extent to which they viewed and acted on prices. For example, we don't know when a customer sees a high price for several days hence and therefore does not schedule pumping in that hour. It would show up in the data as an hour in which the customer had no usage and therefore no ex-post settlement or dynamic transactions.

customers appeared to benefit from dynamic transactions, but often engaged in unscheduled pumping without transactions.

Table 6.2: Comparison of Hours with and without Dynamic Transactions

		kWh				Average $/kWh	
(1) AgFIT	(2) Customer	(3) Total	(4) Has Dynamic Transaction	(5) Ex-post Only	(6) % Not Scheduled kWh	(7) Has Dynamic Transaction	(8) Ex-post Only
2.0	C-001	1,587,141	467,819	1,119,322	71%	0.278	0.356
	C-002	514,959	114,188	400,771	78%	0.306	0.327
	C-003	416,734	276,507	140,227	34%	0.306	0.312
	C-004	32,773	25,772	7,001	21%	0.263	0.334
	C-005	34,821	22,241	12,580	36%	0.243	0.326
2.1	C-001	1,719,019	435,672	1,283,347	75%	0.392	0.432
	C-002	613,553	105,823	507,729	83%	0.339	0.361
	C-003	909,621	561,592	348,030	38%	0.337	0.358
	C-004	294,970	3,426	291,544	99%	0.371	0.428
	C-005	117,361	35,849	81,512	69%	0.348	0.450
	C-006	63,403	57,135	6,268	10%	0.322	0.364
	C-007	2,357	2,175	182	8%	0.027	0.374

Figure 6.1 provides a partial explanation of why customers pay a lower average price per kWh when they schedule pumping versus when they do not. The figure shows the average hourly usage profile by year and whether the hour had a dynamic transaction, summed across the pumps that were actively managed by the Pilot participant (i.e., excluding some customer C-001 pumps and one of customer C-005 pumps). The solid lines reflect usage on days with dynamic transactions (i.e., scheduling pumping ahead of time), while the dashed lines reflect days with pumping usage priced entirely at settlement prices (i.e., unscheduled pumping). Orange lines reflect 2023 data while blue lines reflect 2024 data (May through September in each case).

The figure shows that when customers schedule usage (the solid lines), they are more likely to avoid pumping in the hours that tend to have the highest prices. These are also hours in which OAT peak-period demand charges and energy prices are in effect, reinforcing the notion that we have a hard time distinguishing whether customers are using the automation technology to respond to dynamic prices or OAT rates.

Figure 6.1: Average Hourly Usage by Scheduling Status and Year



Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the same information as Figure 6.1, but for two contrasting customers. Customer C-001, shown in Figure 6.2 (excluding the pumps the customer reported as not being managed to Pilot prices), has a stark difference between load profiles on scheduled versus unscheduled days, with a flat load profile on unscheduled days and usage that drops considerable at hour-ending 18 on scheduled days.

Figure 6.2: Average Hourly Usage by Scheduling Status and Year, C-001



In contrast, customer C-003 (shown in Figure 6.3) appears to be attempting to minimize OAT peak-period usage (from HE 18 to 20) on all days, regardless of whether they scheduled the pumping. The flatter usage associated with unscheduled pumping may reflect times when the customer needs to pump all day regardless of price.

Figure 6.3: Average Hourly Usage by Scheduling Status and Year, C-003



The differences in load profiles on scheduled and unscheduled days explains some of the differences in average prices paid across the two day types, but is likely not large enough to explain the entire difference. It is likely also the case that pumping is more likely to be scheduled when customers notice a particularly low price, whereas unscheduled usage is more likely occur as needed with less attention paid to the dynamic prices.

Table 6.3 provides an additional comparison that may help illustrate customer benefits from Pilot pricing. It compares the average price customers achieved on AgFIT to the average price they would have paid if all usage was purchased at the settlement price (which was the day-ahead price during the periods shown in the table). Bold is used to indicate customers who saved money relative to purchasing entirely at settlement prices, which applies to all but three customers, with two of those having essentially no difference between the two prices. Benefits from transacting ranged from 0.3% to 84%. The simple average of the percentage differences across rows is -8.9%, but using Total kWh to produce a usage-weighted average reduces the value to -1.3%. For customers participating in the Pilot during both years (C-001 through C-005), savings were higher in 2023 than in 2024 (2.5% in 2023 versus 0.5% in 2024, using the usage-weighted average percentage savings). This is consistent with themes we heard during our interviews: customers reported managing to prices differently during 2024 because there was less price variability outside of the peak-period, which some customers were already avoiding in response to the OAT's demand charges.

Notice that customer C-007[55] saved an unusually large amount, saving 84% relative to what they would have paid had they only purchased energy at settlement prices. This was due to a scheduling interface problem in effect from August 21 to September 22, 2024, during which dynamic purchases were treated as having a $0 per kWh price. Thus, when the customer scheduled pumping during those hours, they could purchase the expected usage of their pump for no money and later sell it back at the settlement price, which was unaffected by the problem and thus reflected typical levels. The customer's ability to benefit from the software error was limited by the fact that the customer had no discretion over the dynamic transaction quantities – the amount purchased corresponds to the pump's expected usage (i.e., customer scheduling is a pump / do-not-pump decision rather than a direct decision to purchase a customer-specified quantity of kWh).

Table 6.3: AgFIT Average Price vs. AgFIT Price if All Usage Settled at Ex-Post Prices

AgFIT	Customer	Total kWh	All kWh at Last Rate ($/kWh)	AgFIT ($/kWh)	% Difference
2.0	C-001	1,587,141	0.342	**0.332**	-2.7%
	C-002	514,959	0.323	**0.322**	-0.3%
	C-003	416,734	0.319	**0.307**	-3.7%
	C-004	32,773	0.312	**0.278**	-10.7%
	C-005	34,821	0.285	**0.272**	-4.5%
2.1	C-001	1,719,019	0.422	**0.422**	0.0%
	C-002	613,553	0.357	0.357	0.0%
	C-003	909,621	0.351	**0.344**	-1.8%
	C-004	294,970	0.428	0.428	0.0%
	C-005	117,361	0.420	**0.419**	-0.2%
	C-006	63,403	0.323	0.326	0.8%
	C-007	2,357	0.345	**0.054**	-84.3%

We explored whether customers could systematically benefit by scheduling usage due to biases in the forward prices. For example, if two- to six-day-ahead prices are consistently lower than the day-ahead settlement prices for the same hour of delivery, customers would tend to save money by scheduling. We estimated ten statistical models in which the dependent variable is the difference between the various day-ahead prices (two through six) and the one-day-ahead price that serves as the settlement price. Separate models are estimated for 2023 and 2024, each using data from the May through September growing season. The explanatory variables of interest are hourly indicator variables, for which the estimated coefficients represent the difference between the advance-notice price (e.g., four-day ahead) and the day-ahead price.

Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the estimated coefficients by hour and notice level. A negative value indicates that the advance-notice price is, on average, lower than the day-ahead price during that hour and year, providing an opportunity to save money by scheduling pumping.

The figures provide two notable insights:

[55] Notice that this customer had the lowest usage level among participating customers. In addition, they were the only participant controlling its pump manually.

1. Differences between advance-notice and day-ahead prices are largest during peak hours, which are the hours in which customers are least likely to schedule pumping. That is, while it does appear that customers could consistently benefit (relative to settlement prices) by scheduling pumping during peak hours, they do not tend to schedule pumping during those hours. This is likely due the fact that those are the highest-cost hours even with advance notice, and that the customers are not taking the time to look for arbitrage opportunities.

2. Differences between advance-notice and day-ahead prices tend to be lower in 2024 than 2023. This may be due to the different vendor used to provide forecasts in 2024, which could have led to reduced forecast error when setting advance-notice prices.

Figure 6.4: Average Hourly Difference between Advance-Notice and Day-Ahead Prices, 2023



Figure 6.5: Average Hourly Difference between Advance-Notice and Day-Ahead Prices, 2024



We also examined whether the moving-average price adjustment methods used in AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 could create opportunities for customers to benefit from scheduling pumping. That is, the hourly prices are adjusted so that (in AgFIT 2.1 pricing) the average price for the seven days before and after the delivery date matches the pump's rate schedule average price. This method has the potential to "distort" prices when a high price spike is present in the days used to calculate the average.

Figure 6.6 shows price information for the dates surrounding a price spike that occurred on September 5, 2024. For simplicity, we show only HE 19 prices (the highest-priced hour of the day) and limit the advance notice prices shown to three and six days ahead. In the figure, the blue line represents the day-ahead price by date. Notice that the price reaches nearly $2 per kWh on September 5th but is below 50 cents per kWh on most other dates. The orange and green bars represent the percentage difference between the three- and six-day ahead prices (respectively) that were offered for delivery during that hour and the day-ahead settlement price. For example, on September 8th, the day-ahead settlement price was $0.45 per kWh, the three-day ahead notice price was $0.39 per kWh (13.7% below the day-ahead price), and the six-day-ahead notice price was $0.37 per kWh (18.3% below the day-ahead price).

The figure shows that in the days following the price spike, customers could have paid significantly less by scheduling pumping rather than paying settlement prices. This was not the case in the days leading up to the price spike.

Figure 6.6: Effect of the September 5, 2024 Price Spike on Hourly Prices by Date and Notice Level



In contrast, Figure 6.7 shows a time period during which no price spikes occurred. In this case, the percentage differences between the advance-notice and day-ahead prices were comparatively small and tended to be positive, indicating an average benefit from purchasing at settlement rather than scheduling pumping.

Figure 6.7: Percentage Price Differences by Date and Notice Level with Mild Prices



The conclusions we've reached from the analyses presented in this sub-section are:

- Customers paid less when they scheduled load, but only about one-third of their total usage was scheduled.
- Scheduled loads tended to avoid usage during the highest-priced hours, which contributed to the customers' savings.
- It does not appear that customers systematically benefited from forecast errors in the advance-notice prices (i.e., two or more days ahead). The peak-hour prices tended to be under-forecast relative to settlement prices, but customers generally avoided scheduling usage during those hours.
- The moving-average methodology used in AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 can produce pricing distortions in the dates surrounding price spikes and therefore that method should be excluded from future rate offerings.

6.3.2 Analysis of the Potential for Structural Benefiters and Non-Benefiters

When customers change rate structures, it is common for them to experience a change in their bill independent of any changes in behavior. For example, if a customer changes from a rate schedule with a flat energy rate to one with time-of-use pricing, a customer with a relatively low share of peak-period usage may experience a bill reduction prior to responding to the new price signals. Similarly, the AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods include opportunities for customers to be structural benefiters or non-benefiters because AgFIT's dynamic prices are adjusted to match the pump's rate schedule average OAT price.

The use of the rate schedule average OAT rate to adjust dynamic prices was conceived as a means of tying Pilot prices to OAT levels of revenue recovery without requiring subscriptions. In contrast, had the dynamic prices been adjusted to the customer's own average historical OAT price, the pricing would have embedded the same issue encountered with subscriptions when applied to agricultural pumping customers: historical months with usage patterns which were not a good reflection of current pumping needs and which produced a subscription average price that was out of alignment with current OAT average prices paid. For example, if the subscription is based on a very low load factor load, the subscription price may be quite high relative to what the customer is paying on its OAT rate when they pump more consistently. Using the rate class average OAT price avoided problems with using odd historical years as the basis for Pilot pricing, but introduced the possibility that a customer could benefit when they have a higher cost to serve load profile. For example, if their load factor leads to an average OAT price paid of $0.40 per kWh but the rate schedule average price paid is $0.35 per kWh, the customer obtains the benefit of having its dynamic prices adjusted to the lower level.

We conducted a statistical analysis to examine the extent to which the use of the rate schedule average OAT rate affected a customer's ability to earn credits. Specifically, we estimated a regression model in which the unit of observation is a pump-month, the dependent variable is the pump's credit per kWh (OAT $/kWh minus AgFIT $/kWh, retaining negative values) in that month, and the explanatory variables is the difference between the pump's average OAT price and the pump's rate schedule average OAT price.

We excluded NEM pumps (due to billing issues) and "outliers" in terms of the average prices (omitting observations with credits or average OAT prices greater than 50 cents/kWh) and low usage (below 100 kWh in the month). Note that the results are robust to changes in these exclusions, but some screening is necessary given the use of per-kWh prices in the presence of some low (and sometimes zero) usage values (which results in very high $/kWh values).

Figure 6.8 shows a scatter plot of the credit per kWh (on the vertical axis) and the difference between the pump's average OAT price and the pump's rate schedule average OAT price (on the horizontal axis). Moving to the right on the horizontal axis represents a pump with a higher average OAT price relative to its rate schedule average. Moving up on the vertical axis represents a pump that paid more on the OAT than under Pilot pricing. Therefore, the top right quadrant of the figure contains pumps that received a credit (i.e., the OAT bill was higher than the Pilot bill) and the pump's average OAT rate was higher than the pump's rate schedule average.

The strong positive relationship shows that the greater the gap between the pump's own average OAT price and its rate schedule's average OAT prices, the higher the credit. That is, because AgFIT hourly prices were adjusted to the rate schedule's average, which may not have reflected the pump's actual OAT price, there was an opportunity for customers to benefit, regardless of their own actions.

Figure 6.8: Credit in $/kWh vs. the Difference between the Pump's Average OAT Price and the Rate Schedule Average OAT Price ($/kWh)



Table 6.4 shows the estimated coefficients from the regression model, with p-values in parentheses. The estimate on the OAT price difference of 1.109 reflects a nearly one-to-one correspondence between the difference between the pump's OAT price and the rate

schedule average and the credit the pump subsequently earns on the Pilot. (Note: the credit is calculated as the pump's OAT bill minus the pump's AgFIT charges, so a positive value represents a contribution to a shadow bill credit for the customer.) The R-squared value indicates that 77% of the variation in credits per kWh can be explained by the difference between the customer's average OAT price and their rate schedule's average OAT price.

Table 6.4: Estimates of the Relationship between Monthly Credits and the Difference between Pump and Rate-Class Average OAT Rates

Variable	Estimated Coefficient
Pump OAT \$/kWh – Rate Schedule Average OAT \$/kWh	1.109 (0.000)
Constant	0.006 (0.087)
N = 97, R^2 = 0.773	

p-value in parentheses.

As described above, AgFIT 1.0 embeds an effect that is similar to the structural benefiter effect present for AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1. That is, customer credits can depend on differences between the customer's historical usage used as the basis for its subscription pricing and its current usage profile (for reasons unrelated to price response, such as differences in water conditions, or crop rotations).

Figure 6.9 shows a scatter plot of the average subscription price (\$/kWh) versus the pump's average OAT price for all pumps enrolled in the Pilot during AgFIT 1.0 (from August 2022 through April 2023). The diagonal line is the line of equality for the two prices. Therefore, the upper left portion of the figure represents pumps for which the subscription price is higher than the average OAT price, while the lower right portion of the figure represents pumps for which the subscription price is lower than the average OAT price. As the figure shows, 17 of the 21 pumps had a subscription price lower than the average OAT price. For those pumps, the subscription may have provided an "instant win" for the pump, allowing it to purchase energy for less than it paid under the OAT rate. This will tend to generate shadow bill credits, as the AgFIT charges will likely be less than the OAT bills.

Figure 6.9: AgFIT 1.0 Subscription Price vs. OAT Average Price ($/kWh)



Taken together, we have two conclusions from the analyses presented in this subsection:

- AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 pricing embeds the potential for structural benefiters and non-benefiters; and
- AgFIT 1.0 pricing embeds the potential for a pump to win or lose based on differences in load profiles across years.

6.3.3 Disproportionate OAT vs. AgFIT Bill Changes

Pilot credits are generated when a pump's current OAT bill is greater than its corresponding AgFIT bill. As discussed in Section 2.1, the presence or absence of a Pilot credit is not necessarily indicative of customer performance on the Pilot. For example, customer C-003 has a pump that had a large change in Pilot credit contributions in consecutive months, largely due to how the OAT rate was affected by an increase in billed demand.

Table 6.5 contains summary statistics for the two months, which were billing months beginning in July and August 2024.[56] In July, when the pump's AgFIT bill was higher than its OAT bill, the customer never pumped during the Peak period (0.8 kW versus 152.3 kW for its all-hours maximum demand). In contrast, during August the customer pumped during the Peak period on three days, with a maximum demand of 121.2 kW. This, combined with a higher share of usage during the Peak period (from 0.1% to 4.3%), produced a large increase in the OAT average price paid, from $0.269 per kWh in July to $0.505 per kWh in August. The corresponding change in

[56] The pump is served on Rate Schedule AG-C. Note that we summarize 60-minute demand values (which is the frequency of the interval data provided to us), while AG-C bills using 15-minute demand. AG-C also has a Demand Charge Rate Limiter, which caps the rate per kWh at 50 cents per kWh for all demand- and energy-related rates (i.e., excluding the customer charge).

the AgFIT average price paid was much smaller, increasing from $0.316 per kWh to $0.346 per kWh.

One way to summarize the change in the pump's usage profile is load factor, which is average hourly usage divided by peak demand. Lower load factors are associated with higher average prices paid on demand-based rates. Because AgFIT excludes demand charges, changes in load factor have larger effects on the OAT bill than the AgFIT bill. In short, the credit accrual from August 2024 shown in Table 6.5 does not appear to reflect customer demand response to AgFIT prices but rather is due to the fact that the change in customer usage patterns (i.e., increased Peak-period usage and demand) led to a large increase in the OAT bill, which serves as the benchmark for Pilot credits.

Table 6.5: Illustrative Months for Customer C-003, Pump 1

Result	Bill Start Month	
	July 2024	August 2024
Avg. kWh/hour	67.4	29.8
Peak kW	0.8	121.2
All-hours kW	152.3	150.1
Load Factor	44%	20%
Peak Usage Share	0.1%	4.3%
OAT $/kWh	$0.269	$0.505
AgFIT $/kWh	$0.316	$0.346
OAT - AgFIT $/kWh	-$0.047	$0.159
OAT - AgFIT Bill	**-$2,206**	**$3,640**

It is not typical to see month-to-month changes in credit accruals of the magnitude shown in the example above. Therefore, we investigated the extent to which the relationship between credit accruals and load factor generalizes across pumps and months. Figure 6.10 shows the relationship between load factor[57] and the credit accrual (in $/kWh) across monthly bills and pumps using data from October 2023 through September 2024.[58] The figure shows that lower load factors are associated with higher credits. That is, a low load factor typically results in a high average price paid on the OAT rate because the demand-related costs are a high portion of the bill. Because AgFIT pricing does not contain demand charges, the low load factor has a smaller effect on the AgFIT bill, this making it easier to earn a credit.

[57] Load factor is defined as the average hourly usage divided by the 60-minute all-hours peak demand during the billing period.

[58] We included only billing months for which we were able to perfectly align the billing month dates with hourly interval data (e.g., we could not include billing months that extended into October 2024 because the interval data was only provided through September 30, 2024). We also excluded billing months with zero usage (i.e., because we can't calculate average prices per kWh) and months with a credit accrual (defined as the (OAT bill – AgFIT bill) / kWh) larger than $1.00 per kWh in absolute value (to ensure the analysis isn't driven by outliers).

Figure 6.10: Monthly Load Factor vs. Credit Accrual in $/kWh



We estimated a statistical model to formalize the relationship shown in Figure 6.10. The dependent variable is the credit accrual in $/kWh, calculated as: (OAT bill – AgFIT bill) / kWh. The explanatory variables are the monthly load factor and a constant term. Pump fixed effects are included to account for the pump's rate schedule and any other time invariant pump-specific characteristics that may affect the credit accrual and load factor. In addition to a model that uses all data points shown in Figure 6.10, we estimated separate models by rate schedule to explore differences in the load factor vs. credit relationship across rates.

Table 6.6 shows the estimates, with p-values in parentheses. The coefficient for load factor of -0.300 can be interpreted as follows: an increase in load factor from 25 percent to 75 percent (a 50-percentage point increase) will lead to a reduction in the difference between the OAT and AgFIT average prices of 15 cents per kWh. The R-squared value indicates that more than half of the variability in credit accruals can be explained by load factor and pump fixed effects. When examining estimates by rate schedule, it is important to note that AG-C has, by far, the most observations. Because of this, its estimate is the most statistically significant and the point estimate is close to the estimate for all pumps (-0.289 for AG-C versus -0.300 for all pumps). The remaining rate schedules all have point estimates that reflect the same qualitative relationship, though not all estimates are statistically significant due to small sample sizes.

Table 6.6: Estimated of Relationship between Load Factor and Credit Accruals

Group	Estimated Load Factor Coefficient	Number of Observations	R-squared
All	-0.300 (0.000)	289	0.537
AG-A2	-0.338 (0.228)	26	0.396
AG-B	-0.344 (0.011)	39	0.489
AG-C	-0.289 (0.000)	203	0.592
AG-FB	-0.706 (0.117)	9	0.385
AG-FC	-0.201 (0.035)	12	0.437

p-value in parentheses.

Taken together, the findings of this section indicate that the presence of a credit does not necessarily indicate significant and beneficial price response on the part of the customer. Rather, credits can be accrued via structural benefiter effects and differential effects of exogenous load changes (i.e., unrelated to Pilot pricing) on AgFIT vs. OAT bills.

7 STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

In this section, we provide each of the key stakeholders to the project an opportunity to provide their comments on the Pilot. Each stakeholder's subsection represents their views and not those of other stakeholders or the evaluator.

<u>VCE Comments</u>

The following text was provided by VCE for inclusion in the evaluation.

VCE's original pilot concept to test the willingness and ability of farmers to shift agricultural load by using a combination of price signals, automation, and customer support has shown encouraging results. As a Load Serving Entity responsible for and directly exposed to customer outcomes, we conclude that generally, farmers in our service territory do show a willingness and ability to shift load given the right combination of price signals, automation, and customer support. The pilot also yielded lessons that can be applied to future pilots or rates designed to encourage customer response to dynamic prices in agricultural and other customer classes.

As pilot results are evaluated, we would encourage stakeholders and policymakers to consider the decisions that were made in designing the pilot, as well as the systemic barriers that may have had an impact on customer behavior. While it is important to assess quantifiable metrics, it is also important to assess non-energy impacts such as customer experience and co-benefits (e.g. water conservation) to understand the full value of this pilot. VCE appreciates that this third-party evaluation report recognizes those co-benefits.

Based on the final evaluation results, VCE makes four general observations: (1) agricultural customers are willing to respond to dynamic prices, but sometimes are unable to; (2) further calibration of the rate design is necessary to achieve lasting results; (3) systemic barriers such as timely access to accurate data need to be removed in order to ensure the success of dynamic rates; and (4) non-energy factors and co-benefits can be important additions to the overall value proposition for this type of pilot.

More detailed comments/observations include:

1. Several factors may have limited growers' ability to respond to prices, including weather/precipitation conditions, crop type, and attempts to manage OAT costs.

2. During the pilot, different pricing methodologies were employed to better calibrate the tariff for desired customer load shift and satisfaction (e.g. AgFIT 1.0, 2.0). While these decisions were made to fix issues or better integrate certain cost recovery mechanisms, the changes may have affected customer behavior. More study on the various pricing methodologies is suggested, using a single pricing methodology (e.g. AgFIT 2.1) for at least 3 years.

3. Automation was cited as important by the growers in responding to price signals. However, one cannot overstate the impact of customer engagement on the success of AgFIT. Automation incentives, demand response programs and TOU rates have been available for years, and many participating customers did not take full advantage of these load-shift tools until coached on the utility and use of software during AgFIT.

4. Throughout the course of AgFIT, pilot partners encountered barriers to accessing timely, accurate usage data. VCE was unable to consistently create and share monthly Shadow Bills with customers, so scheduling decisions were not fully guided by pilot performance. In the absence of pilot performance data, growers potentially managed their usage according to existing OAT costs (including demand charges) instead of scheduling on the dynamic rate, potentially affecting results (e.g. how much usage was scheduled).

5. It should be within scope for future dynamic rate pilot evaluation reports to thoroughly assess non-energy and co-benefits associated with the pilot. Additionally, to more fully measure price response to dynamic rates, we would suggest recruiting a wide range of customer load shapes to participate (e.g. customers with a flat load as well as customers actively responding to TOU prices before the pilot).

<u>PG&E Comments</u>

PG&E declined the opportunity to provide comments.

Polaris Comments

The following text was provided by Polaris for inclusion in the evaluation.

- It is reasonable to assume that incentive funding will need to be made available to drive industry transformation and adoption of automation technologies to help consumers manage complex hourly dynamic rate tariffs. There would likely be very few customers able to manage such a tariff without automation equipment and the funding for it. We look to PG&E's Automated Demand Response program as precedent for this.

- The findings from the Pilot illustrate the importance of being nimble enough to rapidly evolve with and adapt from learnings and other program developments that require real-time action. Future pilots should ensure adequate resources and support to tune the pilot towards desired price responsiveness and load shifting outcomes.

TeMix Comments

The following text was provided by TeMix for inclusion in the evaluation.

TeMix believes this pilot, its sister SCE pilot[59], and the previous RATES pilot[60] demonstrate that the CALFUSE vision is technically sound and feasible, reassuring everyone about CALFUSE's direction and potential for future success. The CALFUSE vision features a two-part subscription and dynamic transactive pricing tariff. The subscription component ensures stable bills and cost recovery while supporting resource adequacy and equity. Customer-facing dynamic prices reflect locational scarcity and abundance in conventional and renewable wholesale generation, storage, and transmission. Furthermore, these customer-facing prices account for locational scarcity and losses in two-way distribution service. The vision entails customers' flexible devices primarily responding automatically to these granular, locational dynamic prices, thus eliminating the need for centralized distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). CALFUSE aims not just to be another retail tariff but also to establish a system that enables customer-centric load management to lower system costs and customer bills.

The CALFUSE vision aims to establish a standard tariff (unified, universally acceptable, dynamic economic signal) to replace the numerous complex OAT tariffs[61]. The OAT tariffs include TOU rates, baselines, demand charges, counterfactual demand response, centralized dispatch of distributed energy resources (DERs), and virtual power plants (VPPs). These demand-side programs are costly and inefficient. For example, PG&E has requested $761 million through 2030 to partially update its COBAL billing system to handle the complexities of the existing complex OAT tariffs and demand-side programs[62].

[59] SCE Dynamic Rate Pilot – Emerging Markets & Technologies
[60] Complete and Low-Cost Retail Automated Transactive Energy System (RATES) – Emerging Markets & Technologies
[61] Page 2 of the June 22, 2022 Energy Division white paper entitled "Advanced Strategies for Demand Flexibility Management and Customer DER Compensation".
[62] $761.3 million for a Billing System?

How much money could be saved by transitioning to a uniform CALFUSE tariff for all customers?

Tying the subscriptions to OAT tariffs was a temporary way to kick off the pilot. The vision is to base the CALFUSE subscriptions on the same formulas used for dynamic pricing, with inputs for these formulas relying on forward hourly forecasts extending more than a week ahead with various ways to construct the subscription load shapes. The TeMix Platform™ offers the computing infrastructure and methodology necessary to fully implement these subscription transactions and the CALFUSE vision at scale.

Before the pilot began, there was discussion of a one-part tariff; however, the CPUC and VCE opted for TeMix's two-part tariff in line with the CPUC CALFUSE design. Midway through AgFIT 1.0, with only two customers, it was decided to abandon the two-part CALFUSE tariff with subscriptions in favor of an untested, ad-hoc, one-part tariff. This one-part tariff adjusted the average dynamic prices to align with the average OAT prices for AgFIT 2.0 over the next seven days, and for AgFIT 2.1, it used a fourteen-day period that included seven days ahead and seven days back. This daily price averaging distorts the dynamic prices in a way that is difficult to comprehend. It does not make sense for a price spike from seven days ago or seven days ahead to influence today's hourly prices. PG&E identified an exploitable flaw in the combination of price averaging and forward transactions and recommends that this combination not be used in future offerings.

As noted in the report, customers whose load shapes deviate from the average load shapes of an OAT rate class can instantly become either winners or losers with the one-part price averaging tariff. This issue is particularly significant for customers with solar generation. Furthermore, fixed customer charges and any income-based fixed charges cannot be accurately represented in a one-part tariff; therefore, a two-part tariff is necessary. Lastly, following any forward transaction, a one-part tariff transitions into a two-part tariff. PG&E has adopted the two-part tariff for its extended pilot, which is used for only a brief duration. The AgFIT 1.0 two-part tariff performed well and did not require immediate replacement. However, numerous opportunities to enhance the two-part tariff were never pursued due to the shift to a one-part tariff. The work and expenses associated with AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 held little value and would have been much more beneficial if allocated toward developing and testing subscriptions that were not tied to OAT tariffs.

The California energy system increasingly relies on primarily fixed-cost renewable generation, storage, transmission lines, and energy-consuming devices that require no fuel and have minimal variable costs. There is no straightforward method to calculate the customer-facing marginal energy cost. Energy prices can be influenced by the customer's willingness to adjust and optimize their energy usage during extreme weather conditions and grid events.

For AgFIT 1.0, TeMix implemented a scarcity pricing methodology developed during the RATES pilot. Higher energy prices recover a larger share of the largely fixed costs of generation when overall loads and load ramps are elevated, or circuits are more heavily loaded in either direction. For AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1, PG&E introduced pricing formulas and complex spreadsheets that relied on outdated marginal cost concepts, including flat $/kWh charges, which diminished the effectiveness of the price signals.

The CPUC's decision to shadow-bill customers as a means of bill protection severely compromised the AgFIT pilot. As outlined in this report, many customers continued to focus on minimizing their OAT charges, including demand charges, rather than reducing their AgFIT bills. The subscriptions in a two-part tariff stabilize customer bills for bill protection, rendering the entire shadow billing and credit system unnecessary.

TeMix understands that California's electricity institutions require time to implement the CALFUSE vision fully. Retail pricing, distribution services, and wholesale operations are separate systems with their experts and infrastructures. The CALFUSE system can concurrently address customer, distribution, wholesale operational, investment issues, and billing.

Dynamic pricing may intimidate some, but it should not be viewed this way in the context of the CALFUSE two-part subscription transactive tariff. The transactive components of the CALFUSE vision are essential for enabling effective operational planning and generating savings for energy customers and suppliers, as well as for distribution and transmission services. Months and years in advance, physical transactions are needed to ensure resource adequacy. These transactive features also enable intra-day and intra-hour price responses to maintain grid reliability and savings, particularly during extreme grid conditions.

California's complex retail tariffs and demand-side programs require replacement. CALFUSE presents a vision and roadmap to foster a more customer-centric, efficient, clean, and equitable electricity system.

8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our summary of the key takeaways from the Pilot can be divided into two categories: comments on the enrolled customer experience; and comments on the shadow billing and pricing methods used during the Pilot.

8.1 Customer Experience

<u>Customers face constraints that may limit their ability to respond to prices.</u>

Agricultural pumping customers face a number of operational constraints that can vary seasonally and with weather conditions (e.g., causing them to need to run in all hours, not need to pump at all, or need to have minimum run times) that may affect their ability to shift or reduce load at any given time. While the load can sometimes be highly responsive, one should not assume that a high percentage of the pumping load will be curtailed in response to a specific high-price event. In addition, customers may not be aware of a high-price hour if they scheduled pumping for that hour before the spike showed up in pricing. Interviews revealed little awareness of price spikes in 2022 and 2023.

Automating pump operations helped customers respond to prices.

Customers value the ability to control pumps remotely and can use it to respond to both TOU and dynamic prices. One customer reported in an interview that the technology incentives in the Pilot were important, and the customer would not have been able to install the automation without them.

Customers paid a lower average price when they scheduled pumping.

Customers were effective in their use of pump scheduling, obtaining a lower average price per kWh than they would have paid if they'd purchased all usage at settlement prices. Scheduled pumping was less likely to occur during peak hours than unscheduled pumping, which contributed to the savings from scheduling. However, two-thirds of usage during the Pilot was purchased at settlement prices, so scheduled pumping was not the dominant behavior for most customers.

Customers need more frequent billing feedback to understand the benefits.

Customers need more frequent feedback on their savings/billing under the Pilot to be able to determine the value of their actions and adjust their behavior accordingly.

In a post-Pilot world, customers will compare dynamic pricing to TOU pricing if both are available as voluntary rates. If the pump's TOU rate provides greater bill savings to the customer (either because it's easier to act on or because the rewards to responding are higher), it is unlikely that they would adopt dynamic pricing as a voluntary rate even if it has better pricing from a societal perspective (i.e., even if TOU rates "overpay" customers for peak-period usage reductions and dynamic rates do not).

Interviewed customers had positive views of the Pilot but had some reservations about whether they would adopt it as a permanent rate. Managing usage under dynamic pricing is time consuming.

The interviewed customers had positive things to say about their experience, but they need more information to determine whether Pilot pricing would work for them as a permanent rate. They reported valuing the automation, the Pilot incentives, and the Pilot credits, but needed to learn more before understanding whether the time it takes to respond to dynamic prices leads to high enough benefits. Customers are busy and the time it takes to manage usage against dynamic prices needs to have a corresponding benefit.

8.2 Shadow Billing and Pricing Methods

The shadow bill credit method affected Pilot results and how they ought to be interpreted.

While on AgFIT, the customer pays its current OAT bill and will receive a credit each year[63] if the sum of its OAT bills is greater than the sum of its shadow (Pilot) bills calculated separately for each service account (typically one meter). However, those OAT bills may be higher than their pre-Pilot OAT bills if the customers stop managing their billed demand and instead focus on the dynamic prices. Therefore, the presence or absence of an AgFIT credit is not necessarily indicative of whether the customer benefited from Pilot participation. A customer who used the automation (i.e., remote pump control) technology to reduce their OAT bill would receive that benefit in the current month's bill and could further benefit by trying to respond to dynamic prices to earn an AgFIT credit, provided the response did not conflict with the incentives embedded in the OAT rates. In other words, a profit-maximizing customer may focus mostly on its OAT bill, which could reduce dynamic load response compared to what the customer would have done in the absence of the shadow bill credit methodology.

In addition, because the shadow bill credit method meant that Pilot customers should have continued to pay attention to OAT price signals while participating in the Pilot, we were unable to conduct a valid evaluation of customer response to Pilot prices alone. That is, at any given time, customers face two sets of incentives (not to mention the various forward contracting opportunities presented by the Pilot) and it is not possible for us to know with certainty which price signals are driving the resulting behavior. All price response analyses in this report should be viewed through this lens. For example, we know from our interview that customer C-005 paid close attention to the Pilot's hourly prices and responded to them, but they had no peak-period usage to adjust to hourly prices because of an everyday response to the OAT demand charge. Our statistical estimates of their price response captured this behavior, but made it unable for us to determine what their peak-period price responsiveness would have been in the absence of the OAT incentives.

The change to one-part pricing under AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 addressed an issue in AgFIT 1.0's two-part pricing but had other consequences.

A motivation for changing from two-part pricing to one-part pricing (in May 2023) was to avoid subscription prices that were based on historical loads that did not reflect pumping needs in the Pilot period. For example, if the historical month used to calculate the subscription had an unusually low load factor, the subscription would have a very high price that may have made it difficult for the customer to save money on the Pilot pricing.

The one-part pricing method used in the 2023 and 2024 growing seasons addressed this issue by removing subscriptions and instead adjusting the dynamic prices to match the average rate paid on the pump's rate schedule. The removal of the subscription and adoption of this method of linking Pilot prices to OAT revenue levels introduced a different source of structural benefiters and non-benefiters. That is, a pump with a lower load

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[63] The expectation at the beginning of the Pilot was that credit calculations would be based on 12 months of billing data. In practice, the number of months used to calculate credits varied over the course of the Pilot.

factor vs. the rate schedule average would pay a higher average OAT price per kWh but would receive the benefit of having its dynamic prices scaled to the lower rate schedule average. We confirmed that this structural benefiter effect was present in customer outcomes. That is, larger differences between a pump's average OAT price and its rate schedule average OAT price were associated with higher shadow bill credits. Note that the presence of structural benefiters is common feature of voluntary rates (e.g., customers with flatter load profiles experiencing a lower bill after changing from a flat to a TOU rate, even in prior to any price response) and is therefore not necessarily a reason to avoid using the AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 pricing methods.

However, the price averaging used to develop AgFIT 2.0 and 2.1 prices leads to pricing distortions in the days around price spikes that could be systematically arbitraged by customers.[64] While there is no evidence that customers engaged in this form of arbitrage during the Pilot, the moving-average pricing method should not be used in future rate offerings to prevent the possibility of it happening.

<u>Customers appear to pay more attention to prices when price variability is higher.</u>

Hourly prices were less variable across and within days in 2024 than in 2023, which corresponded to a lower share of scheduled pumping in 2024 and a lower benefit from scheduling pumping. Customer interviews were consistent with this, with feedback indicating that they paid less attention to prices in 2024 than 2023.

[64] For example, a customer could systematically benefit by scheduling pumping for future days after experiencing a day with especially high prices, regardless of whether they expect to need to pump on those days. If they end up pumping, the purchased energy would tend to cost less than if they had purchased it at settlement prices and if they do not end up pumping, they would tend to benefit by selling the purchased energy at higher settlement prices.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Day Type Comparisons by Customer

In the following figures, we compare average hourly prices and loads across the two day types. Each year is presented as a two-figure panel, with the top panel showing average prices and the bottom panel showing average usage. The dashed lines represent the high-priced days and the solid lines represent the comparison days, with separate figures by year. For two customers (C-001 and C-005), we further differentiate between pumps that are managed to Pilot prices by the customer vs. those that are either not managed to Pilot prices (for customer C-001) or leased to a different customer (for customer C-005). We have set the vertical scale to be constant within customer to facilitate comparisons across years.

A.1 Customer C-001

When examining customer C-001's managed loads, the differences between the high-price and comparison days vary somewhat across years. In 2022 (Figure A.1), the usage in the highest-priced hours is low compared to that of the comparison days. To some extent, this is matched by reductions in earlier hours, during which the two price profiles don't differ much. In contrast, the 2023 comparison shows little difference in usage across the two day types. The 2024 comparison (Figure A.3) is somewhat similar to 2022, though the difference in usage across hours is more of an all-hours shift downward.

Figure A.1: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-001 Managed, 2022



Figure A.2: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-001 Managed, 2023



Figure A.3: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-001 Managed, 2024



Figures A.4 and A.5 show the 2023 and 2024 comparisons for customer C-001's pumps that were not managed to dynamic prices. (The applicable pumps were not enrolled in the Pilot in 2022.) The figures show generally lower usage in both years, with the reductions spread across nearly all hours of the day. Because we know that these customers were not managed to Pilot prices, we can infer that the usage differences are due to non-price effects. Therefore, the figures may provide an indication of the types of non-price effects that are embedded in the figures for the managed pumps.

Figure A.4: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-001 Not Managed, 2023



Figure A.5: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-001 Not Managed, 2024



A.2 Customer C-002

The figures for customer C-002 provide mixed evidence of response to high-price days. In 2022 (Figure A.6), there is very little difference in the usage profiles by day type, though both reflect the avoidance of the highest prices during their respective days. (I.e., more of an everyday response to average peak prices rather than a response to the peak prices on a specific day.) The usage profiles in 2023 (Figure A.7) are more consistent with price response across day types, with the high-price usage profile being notably lower than the comparison usage during the highest-price hours. Figure A.8 shows usage differences in 2024 that appear unrelated to the price differences. The peak-hour usage is higher on the high-price days, while the earlier hours of the day (when prices are nearly the same across day types) have much lower usage on the high-price day.

Figure A.6: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-002, 2022



Figure A.7: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-002, 2023



Figure A.8: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-002, 2024



A.3 Customer C-003

Customer C-003 provides a good example of a customer who appears to be responding to both OAT and Pilot pricing. In Figure A.9, the customer entirely avoids peak-period (HE18-20) usage on both day types, thus minimizing billed demand under OAT pricing. Evidence presented in this report indicates a response to off-peak dynamic prices, but it is not readily apparent in Figures A.9 and A.10. However, Figure A.10 does reflect the possibility that some peak-period usage may be reduced on higher-price days (i.e., in the absence of the Pilot, they would have used slightly more during peak hours but would still be somewhat restrained by the OAT demand charges).

Figure A.9: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-003, 2023



Figure A.10: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-003, 2024



A.4 Customer C-004

Figures A.11 and A.12 show that customer C-004 likely had no usage to curtail during the highest-price hours. In 2023, the customer only pumped in overnight hours on both day types. According to Polaris, this pump was filling a reservoir in 2023 and therefore did not follow traditional crop irrigation profiles or needs. In 2024, the customer appeared to have no need to pump on either day type.

Figure A.11: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-004, 2023



Figure A.12: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-004, 2024



A.5 Customer C-005

As with customer C-003, the pump managed by customer C-005 entirely avoided using during peak hours (on all days, not just those shown in the figures). Our interview with them confirmed that this was a response to the OAT demand charge. However, the customer reported being very attentive to dynamic prices in other hours. Response to those prices is difficult to identify in these figures, as the differences in prices across day types is small in most hours of the day.

Figure A.13: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-005 Managed, 2023



Figure A.14: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-005 Managed, 2024



For the pump that customer C-005 leased to another customer, the 2023 usage profile is consistent with price response (i.e., usage dropped to zero on the high-price days), but the 2024 usage profile showed no need for pumping on either day type. Our interview with customer C-005, who reported that the leasing customer was not responding to prices, indicates that the usage differences shown in Figure A.15 are likely unrelated to the price differences.

Figure A.15: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-005 Leased, 2023



Figure A.16: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-005 Leased, 2024



A.6 Customer C-006

Figure A.17 shows that customer C-006 used essentially no energy on the high-price days, whereas the comparison days had some usage in the pre-peak hours. This may be response to prices, though the pre-peak hours had little difference in prices.

Figure A.17: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-006, 2024



A.7 Customer C-007

Figure A.18 shows little evidence of price response for customer C-007. The customer rarely pumped during the highest-price hours (across all days, as shown in Section 2) and the usage differences that exist between the two usage profiles are in the opposite direction than one would expect from price response (e.g., higher usage during HE 17 on the high-price days despite the higher price relative to the comparison days).

Figure A.18: High Price vs. Comparison Day Usage and Prices, C-007, 2024



Appendix B: Price Response Regression Model Statistics

Table B.1: Regression Model Statistics

Customer	Managed?	AgFIT 1.0		AgFIT 2.0		AgFIT 2.1	
		N	R^2	N	R^2	N	R^2
C-001	No	N/A	N/A	9,504	0.278	9,192	0.340
	Yes	9,154	0.337	41,904	0.276	49,128	0.446
C-002	Yes	8,530	0.212	28,800	0.141	32,520	0.182
C-003	Yes	N/A	N/A	21,696	0.295	38,016	0.446
C-004	Yes	N/A	N/A	1,416	0.397	32,832	0.348
C-005	Leased to a Customer	N/A	N/A	2,880	0.053	3,648	0.185
	Yes	N/A	N/A	2,832	0.263	3,672	0.297
C-006	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7,296	0.327
C-007	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2,688	0.456